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Between 1850 and 1930, demographic upheaval in the United States was connected to reorganization of the racial
order. Sociallyand politically recognized boundaries between groups shifted, new groups emerged, others disappeared,
and notions of who belonged in which category changed. All recognized racial groups—blacks, whites, Indians,
Asians, Mexicans and others—were affected. This article investigates how and why census racial classiﬁcation
policies changed during this period, only to stabilize abruptly before World War II. In the context of demographic
transformations and their political consequences, we ﬁnd that census policy in any given year was driven by a
combination of scientiﬁc, political, and ideological motivations.
Based on this analysis, we rethink existing theoretical approaches to censuses and racial classiﬁcation, arguing
that a nation’s census is deeply implicated in and helps to construct its social and political order. Censuses
provide the concepts, taxonomy, and substantive information by which a nation understands its component parts
as well as the contours of the whole; censuses both create the image and provide the mirror of that image for a
nation’s self-reﬂection. We conclude by outlining the meaning of this period in American history for current and
future debates over race and classiﬁcation.
The classiﬁcation by race or color of individ-
uals, or even entire populations, is not only
very difﬁcult, but is a very delicate matter to
the United States Government.
—Census Director, 15 October 1936
1
[The Census Bureau should be] the greatest
statistical laboratory of the United States gov-
ernment, worthy to rank with the best statistical
ofﬁces maintained by European governments.
—Secretary of Commerce and Labor, 1902
2
These ﬁgures are of little value.
—Census Population volume on number of
quadroons, octoroons, and mulattoes, 1890
3
Between the Civil War and World War II, the United
States underwent a profound process of racial reor-
ganization. Ofﬁcially recognized group categories
expanded and contracted; socially recognized
boundaries between groups blurred and shifted;
citizens and public actors passionately debated who
belonged in which group. Basic components of the
racial order were revised, revisited, and fundamen-
tallyaltered. Such debates were highly consequential.
Whilewhites never lost their position at the top of the
status hierarchy, who belonged in this privileged
group was hotly contested. Whether or not a given
group or individual was included in the category of
“white” profoundly affected that group’s or person’s
social standing. Blacks and Chinese were placed into
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and an anonymous reviewer for their very helpful suggestions for
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59an ugly contest for the bottom of the status hierarchy,
with the “victory” depending a great deal on how
public ofﬁcials deﬁned and bounded the group.
Simultaneously, whether American Indians were
deemed assimilable, whether Mexican Americans
should be subject to Jim Crow laws, and whether
South Asians would be excluded along with
Paciﬁc-rim Asians all depended in part on whether
they were classiﬁed in terms that allowed them to be
potential insiders or that deﬁned them as perennially
outside the status of “American.” Most broadly, over
the course of almost a century, the U.S. government
groped its way through extensive experimentation—
reorganizing and reimagining the racial order, with
corresponding impact on individuals’ and groups’
life chances.
All branches of government and all levels of
governance were involved to a greater or lesser
degree in this process of racial reorganization. For
reasons that we explain below, this article focuses
on the crucial role of the Census Ofﬁce (after
1902, the Census Bureau).
4 Brieﬂy put, we focus on
the census because a nation’s census is deeply impli-
cated in and helps to construct its social and political
order. Censuses provide the concepts, taxonomy,
and substantive information by which a nation
understands its component parts as well as the con-
tours of the whole. A census both creates the image
and provides the mirror of that image for a nation’s
self-reﬂection.
In the United States, the social and political order
was largely deﬁned by race. In fact, the process of
simultaneously creating and reﬂecting group
classiﬁcations was so important that by 1904, statis-
tician Walter Willcox could correctly observe that
“there is no country in which statistical investigation
of race questions is so highly developed ...as in the
United States.”
5 Highly developed it may have
been—but the American approach to racial
classiﬁcation was also peculiar, reﬂecting the particu-
larities of various experiments in racial classiﬁcation.
In any single year and across decades, racial
categorization was internally incoherent, inconsistent
across groups, and unstable. Mixture between blacks
and others was identiﬁed, elaborated, and then
dropped. Asians were racially identiﬁed through
nationality, in ﬁner and ﬁner grained detail.
Latin Americans were variously classiﬁed as white,
mulatto, or racially distinct. Whites were
elaborately distinguished by country of birth,
“mixed parentage” (referring to parents’ place of
birth),
6 or mother tongue. In the only instance of
racializing religion, immigrants from South Asia
were combined under the “Hindoo” category.
Native Americans were alternately ignored and cate-
gorized down to tiny fractions of black and white
“blood.”
7
Then experimentation abruptly ceased. The 1930
census marked the last stage of the period of racial
reorganization; after that year, the Census Bureau
perceived only three races (white, Negro, Indian)
and ﬁve Asian nationalities for many decades. It no
longer explicitly identiﬁed racial mixture,
8 mixed
parentage, the Mexican race, Hindoos, fractions of
Indian blood,
9 or other innovative categories. After
1940, it no longer used the term “color” in conjunc-
tion with “race.” The United States entered World
War II with the racial order established and the era
of racial reorganization complete—until it started
unraveling again toward the end of the twentieth
century.
This trajectory raises two empirical questions to be
pursued here: why was the Census Bureau’s system of
racial categorization so inconsistent and unstable,
and why did experimentation in reorganizing the
racial order begin and end when it did? Although
others have recognized the importance of these ques-
tions, no one has as of yet systematically pursued their
answers for all groups across the full time period, as
we argue is essential for complete understanding.
This analysis also raises broader theoretical
questions about what censuses do, and why they
matter politically: How do censuses relate to the eth-
noracial order more generally? When and why do
states count their populations by race, and why do
these classiﬁcation schemes take the particular
forms that they do? What impact do classiﬁcation
systems have?
Our answer to the ﬁrst empirical question, why this
particular pattern of experimentation, focuses atten-
tion on the internal dynamics of a rather mysterious
agency. We show below that three motivations inter-
acted to produce ofﬁcials’ choice of categories for
classifying a given group in a given year—contestation
between Congress and the bureaucracy over political
control, elected and appointed ofﬁcials’ commitment
to scientiﬁc integrity, and the pull of ideological
4. Through 1900, the Census Ofﬁce was newly convened every
decade in order to conduct each census and produce the sub-
sequent analysis and reports. Congress created the Census
Bureau as a permanent government agency in 1902, upgrading
its status at the same time.
5. Walter Willcox, “Census Statistics of the Negro,” Yale Review
13 (1904): 274.
6. Or even grandparents’ place of birth, if the parent was born
at sea.
7. After a ﬁrst usage, often in quotations, we continue by using
the terms common to the period about which we are writing. Fol-
lowing the same logic, we do not capitalize “negro” until the
Census Bureau itself started to do so, in 1918.
8. According to Census Bureau lore, the “other” line added
to the race question in 1910 served as the locus for “mixed race”
enumerations until 1990, when it became primarily the site for
Hispanics who did not identify with any of the United States’
racial categories.
9. In 1950, the Census Bureau did measure fractions of Indian
blood on a supplemental schedule used only on reservations.
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these motivations reinforced each other; sometimes
they were mutually constitutive; and sometimes they
pulled in opposite directions from one another.
In conjunction, they generated a set of categories
that enabled the basic hierarchy of white supremacy
and nonwhite subordination to be maintained,
along with the distinction between actual or potential
Americans and perennial outsiders, but that also led
to great confusion about who nonwhites and outsi-
ders were, how they would be deﬁned in relationship
to other groups, and how much they would be subor-
dinated or excluded.
Our answer to the second empirical question, why
this particular period saw such experimentation in
creating a racial order, shifts our attention from the
Census Bureau’s internal actions to its external
context. Although there are many plausible answers,
we argue that they boil down to one: the politics of
population change. The United States underwent
extraordinary transformations geographically, demo-
graphically, institutionally, and politically between
the Civil War and the Great Depression, and we will
show how the Census Bureau, like all government
ofﬁces, struggled simply to keep up, let alone to get
control of the situation. For a variety of reasons,
those changes ceased by 1930, and, with their
demise, the impetus to change the census yet again
also ceased.
Making sense of the process of racial reorganiz-
ation in the United States requires a theoretical fra-
mework about the relationship between a census
and the racial order that previous studies have
not established. Thus we ﬁrst set the stage for
answering the empirical questions by considering
more broadly how censuses help to create and soli-
dify a modern polity’s racial order. We build on
existing literature to generate more systematic
claims on that point. We then explore the
dynamics shaping the U.S. Census Bureau’s role
in reorganizing the racial order from 1850
through 1930. We show how context and choice
interacted in creating classiﬁcations of what is
now understood as the ethnoracial pentagon
(white, black, Asian, Native American, and Hispa-
nic).
10 Next, we consider why the period from
1850 through 1930 was especially important for
developing the American racial order, and why
experimentation in racial reorganization ended
when it did. We conclude by moving back out to
broader issues of what racial order was left in
place after experimentation ended, what our analy-
sis implies for the contemporary politics of racial
classiﬁcation in the United States, and what
remains to be considered in future research.
CENSUSES AND THE RACIAL ORDER
Border warfare of the most primitive type still is
waged in mountain fastnesses, the darkest
pages in the annals of crime now are being
written, ... and from their factory prisons a
hundred thousand children cry aloud for
rescue. ... In hazardous scout duty into these
ﬁelds of danger the Census Bureau leads.
The Census is the sword that shatters secrecy,
the key that opens trebly-guarded doors; the
Enumerator is vested with the Nation’s greatest
right—the Right To Know—and on his ﬁnd-
ings all battle-lines depend.
11
Despite valiant, if misguided, efforts to romanticize
the role of a census bureau, it is not immediately
obvious what political and substantive role a census
plays in a polity. Professionals within a census
bureau think of themselves as demographers, scien-
tists intentionally removed from the hurly-burly and
ambiguities of politics and policy-making. Census
directors know that theirs is a political role, but a
large part of their mission is to protect the appear-
ance and reality of scientiﬁc neutrality. The directors
may have been too successful; perhaps because the
task of enumeration seems on its surface to be
straightforward, political scientists have insufﬁciently
theorized censuses. Thus it is necessary to begin
with the big picture about how and why the United
States census, and censuses in general, are intensely
political actors.
How Does a Census Help to Shape the Racial Order? In
almost every modern society that classiﬁes its popu-
lation, a census sits at the center of institutional
expressions of the ethnoracial order. That order is
constituted by a combination of ideological beliefs,
both about one’s own group and about others, and
institutional and social practices, again both within
and outside a given group. Together, beliefs and prac-
tices determine what the meaningful group cat-
egories are, how they are bounded, who belongs in
each, and where each group’s status is situated in
relation to the others. The racial order helps to
guide the polity’s and individuals’ choices about the
distribution of goods and resources, and does a
great deal to shape each person’s life chances. We
focus here especially on two dimensions of relative
positioning in the American racial order: vertical or
ranked hierarchy, and a horizontal dimension dis-
tinguishing insiders from outsiders.
12
A census’s system of racial classiﬁcation does not by
itself create the ethnoracial order; in fact, classiﬁ-
cation schemes are neither necessary nor sufﬁcient
tools for constructing and maintaining ethnoracial
10. The term is from David Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond
Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
11. FrancisRolt-Wheeler,TheBoywiththeU.S.Census(Charleston
SC, BiblioBazaar, 2006 [1911]), Preface.
12. Claire Kim, “The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans,”
Politics and Society 27 (1999): 103–36.
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do not collect ofﬁcial statistics by race, but racial iden-
tity and stratiﬁcation exist there nonetheless.
13 In
other countries such as Lebanon, the ethnoracial
order is so fraught that ethnic or racial data are too
contentious to collect or publish. Classiﬁcation may
be selective and applied only to particular groups,
as distinguished from creating an entire classiﬁcation
system for the whole population. Most Latin Ameri-
can countries, for example, do not systematically cat-
egorize their populations by race, but some
have census questions about membership in particu-
lar indigenous groups or ask about indigenous
language use.
14 Thus in Mexico, Colombia, and
Peru, the census identiﬁes the indigenous but not
the African-descent populations.
15 On the other
hand, even an ofﬁcial classiﬁcation system cannot
create or sustain ethno-racial hierarchy without
support from other social and political institutions.
Classiﬁcation alone will not transform an unranked
ethnic order into a ranked one.
16
Nevertheless, around the world, states increasingly
count and categorize their populations according to
ethnicity or race for purposes of public policymak-
ing.
17 And where they undertake such a task, the
census is central. A modern census helps to construct
and reconstruct an ethnoracial order in four ways: by
providing the taxonomy and language of race; gener-
ating the informational content for that taxonomy:
facilitating the development of public policies; and
generating numbers upon which claims to political
representation are made. Let us consider each in
turn.
As many scholars have pointed out, censuses create
the ofﬁcial language and taxonomy of race and
imbue them with the authority of the state. Census
racial policy deﬁnes the meaningful categories,
locates boundaries between groups, assigns people
to one category or another, and indicates which
groups are subsets of or superordinate in relation to
one another.
18 “Race” or “ethnicity” receive meaning
in relation to otherconcepts such as color, nationality,
classes of populations, language, place of birth, blood
quantum, mother tongue, stock, or peoples. Are races
more biologically ﬁxed than ethnicities? Is mother
tongue a truer representation of a person’s identity
than nationality or place of birth? Did the tiny
colony of Ceylon really need seventy-eight national-
ities and twenty-four races to identify its population,
as the British apparently thought in their 1871
census of the island?
19 What is meant in New
Zealand when the proportion of respondents choos-
ing “New Zealander” as their ethnicity on the census
increases from 2 to 11 percent over ﬁve years?
20 As
we will see below, the terminology with which
groups are labeled can contribute to determining
their position and trajectory in a nation’s racial order.
Second, a census then ﬁlls in its taxonomy. The
census produces ostensibly objective data about the
size of groups, as well as residential patterns, edu-
cation, income, occupations, marital status, housing,
age, and perhaps other characteristics such as reli-
gion, voting participation, or nativity and citizenship
status. Many public and private actors may gather
information about various groups—but the census is
uniquely mandated to provide authoritative public
information, and to do so on a scope and scale
unmatched by other government institutions or
private researchers. And as former census director
Kenneth Prewitt points out, the information gener-
ated through censuses has a unique standing:
“These are not matters of idle curiosity. Every ques-
tion asked in the U.S. census connects to a speciﬁc
government program or purpose.”
21
13. Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and
Policymaking since the 1960’s (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2006); Patrick Simon, “Ethnic Statistics: Fighting against
Discrimination,” presented at Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity:
Should We Count, How Should We Count, and Why?, Montreal,
Quebec: 6–8 Dec. 2007.
14. Heather Layton and Harry Patrinos, “Estimating the
Number of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America,” in Indigenous
Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin America, ed. Gillette
Hall and Harry Patrinos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),
25–39.
15. George Andrews, Afro-Latin America: 1800–2000.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
16. DonaldHorowitz,EthnicGroupsinConﬂict,rev. ed.(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000).
17. Ann Morning, “Ethnic Classiﬁcation in Global Perspective:
A Cross-National Survey of the 2000 Census Round” Population
Research and Policy Review (forthcoming); Patrick Simon, “Ethnic”
Statistics and Data Protection in the Council of Europe Counties (Stras-
bourg, France: Council of Europe, European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance, 2007); Victor Thompson and Tahu
Kukutai, “Inside-Out: The Politics of Enumerating the Nation,” pre-
sented at Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity: Should We Count,
How Should We Count, and Why?, Montreal, Quebec: 6–8 Dec.
2007.
18. Kenneth. Prewitt, “A Nation Imagined, a Nation Measured:
The Jeffersonian Legacy,” in Across the Continent: Jefferson, Lewis and
Clark, and the Making of America, ed. Douglas Seefeldt, Jeffrey
Hantman, and Peter Onuf (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2005), 132–68; Valery Tishkov, “The Population Census
and the Construction of Identity,” Anthropology and Archeology of
Eurasia 44 (2005): 10–40; Tom Moultrie and Rob Dorrington,
“Used for Ill; Used for Good: A Century of Collecting Data on
Race in South Africa,” presented at Social Statistics and Ethnic
Diversity: Should We Count, How Should We Count, and Why?,
Montreal, Quebec, 6–8 Dec. 2007.
19. Kalinga Tudor Silva, “Politics of Ethnicity and Population
Censuses in Sri Lanka,” presented at Social Statistics and Ethnic
Diversity: Should We Count, How Should We Count, and Why?,
Montreal, Quebec, 6–8 Dec. 2007.
20. Tahu Kukutai and Robert Didham, “Can National Identity
Become Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Emerging New Zealander
Ethnic Group,” presented at Social Statistics and Ethnic Diversity:
Should We Count, How Should We Count, and Why?, Montreal,
Quebec, 6–8 Dec. 2007.
21. Kenneth Prewitt, “Politics and Science in Census Taking,”
in The American People: Census 2000, ed. Reynolds Farley and John
Haaga (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005), 3.
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policies that reinforce or undermine a racial order.
It does not in any simple sense cause these policies
to come into existence, but it makes some more feas-
ible and makes a few possible. Prewitt argues that “it
would of course be an exaggeration to attribute the
racialization of American politics to the census. But
the availability of a racial taxonomy—counting and
sorting by race—was handmaiden to the politics of
race that continue to the present.” In particular,
“classiﬁcation separated those entitled to full partici-
pation in society from those whose race was
cause for exclusion.”
22 Congress used data from the
1890 census to set immigration quotas after 1924,
and military leaders used 1940 census data to identify
Japanese and Japanese American residents of thewest
coast for internment during World War II.
23 One
reason that the government of France refuses to
collect racial and ethnic information is its determi-
nation that ofﬁcial data can never again be available
to identify members of a particular group, as census
data were used to round up Jews in Vichy France
during World War II.
Information from a census may enable inclusive as
well as exclusive policies. Census datawere instrumen-
tal in implementing the 1965 Voting Rights Act in the
United States, and they play a continuing role in liti-
gating over afﬁrmative action and employment dis-
crimination and in other policies intended to
disproportionately beneﬁt disadvantaged groups.
Activist groups in Brazil advocate changing how
blacks are identiﬁed on the Brazilian census in part
to facilitate the expansion of race-based afﬁrmation
action policies.
24
Fourth and ﬁnally, census data produce infor-
mation upon which claims to political access and rep-
resentation are made. From the Constitution’s
three-ﬁfths clause for creating a Congress to the judi-
cial mandate to reshape New York City’s councilma-
nic districts in 1991, the location and magnitude of
particular groups have affected how legislative dis-
tricts are bounded and which legislators are
chosen.
25 Data about groups’ proportions may
provide them with the ammunition against the state
for new claims for representation; at the extreme
end, proponents of consociational democracy advo-
cate a form of ethnic proportional representation in
divided societies that relies upon demographic data
derived from censuses.
26 A legislature’s composition,
in turn, affects adoption of policy choices connected
to the racial order; those choices loop back to lend
further aid to the construction of a self-deﬁned
group which can then mobilize and demand further
action.
Why Does a Census Classify According to Race? Why
would a state choose to use a census to classify its
population according to race or ethnicity at all?
Why might racial classiﬁcation take a particular
form? There is no clear and consistent answer
except that virtually all scholars concur with Prewitt’s
starting point: despite demographers’ fervent wish,
“the categories made explicit by any classiﬁcation
scheme are seldom politically neutral.”
27 Extant
explanations of why censuses classify and how they
arrive at a given taxonomy raise important consider-
ations about domestic, international, and institutional
contexts. However, in our view, none can fully explain
the vast array of changes and experimentation that
occurred on the U.S. census in the decades after
1850.
In one view, census classiﬁcation is primarily a
mechanism for racial control and exclusion—an
instance of the broader claim that classiﬁcation is
part of the construction and maintenance of racial
hierarchy and the distinction between insiders and
outsiders.
28 Writing about Brazil and the United
States, for example, Melissa Nobles traces the history
of the mulatto category in order to demonstrate
how race scientists within the Census Ofﬁce (later
Bureau) worked with southern politicians to
produce census policy. The former sought to gener-
ate data supporting their theories of white biological
superiority, while the latter sought evidence to justify
and legitimate policies of non-white exclusion and
white supremacy.
29 Census-taking is thus an exercise
in nation-building and state control—sometimes at
the expense of subordinated groups.
30 Taking this
argument a step further, some perceive the census
22. Prewitt, “A Nation Imagined,” 152.
23. Margo Anderson and William Seltzer, “Challenges to the
Conﬁdentialityof U.S. Federal Statistics, 1910–1965,” Journal of Ofﬁ-
cial Statistics 23 (2007): 1–34.
24. Edward Telles, Race in Another America: The Signiﬁcance of
Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2004).
25. Margo Anderson, The American Census:A Social History (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Reuel Rogers, “Race-based
Coalitions among Minority Groups: Afro-Caribbean Immigrants
and African-Americans in New York City,” Urban Affairs Review 39
(2004): 283–317.
26. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative
Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
27. Prewitt, “A Nation Imagined,” 139; see also Mae Ngai, “The
Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamina-
tion of the Immigration Act of 1924,” Journal of American History 86
(1999): 67–92; Melissa Nobles, Shades of Citizenship: Race and the
Census in Modern Politics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2000).
28. Loı ¨c Wacquant, “For an Analytic of Racial Domination,”
Political Power and Social Theory 11 (1997): 221–34; David Theo
Goldberg, Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America (New York: Rou-
tledge, 1997); Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Racial and
Ethnic Conﬂicts: A Global Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly
107 (1992): 585–606; Tukufu Zuberi, Thicker than Blood: How
Racial Statistics Lie (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2001).
29. Nobles, Shades of Citizenship.
30. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reﬂections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
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to deepen its penetration and control of society
through close and constant scrutiny. Thus adding
the Chinese category in 1870 “was a form of surveil-
lance, a mechanism for imposing order and racial
clarity on the proliferation of an ambiguous alien.”
31
Considered through a different lens or in a differ-
ent historical period, however, policies of racial classi-
ﬁcation might serve aspirational goals. The U.S.
census provided the site of the multiracial move-
ment’s demands for ofﬁcial recognition in the
1990s,
32 and invention of the category of “mother
tongue” became the vehicle by which Jews could dis-
tinguish themselves from both blacks and Gentile
whites many decades earlier.
33 Neither a purely disci-
plinary nor aspirational account can explain the tra-
jectory of change on the U.S. census between 1850
and 1930. Naomi Mezey acknowledges but does not
try to reconcile the disciplinary and the aspirational
roles of the census; Nobles does try by arguing that,
in some historical moments, states actively impose
racial categories on the population, while at others,
states are relatively open to inﬂuence from social
forces such as advocacy groups or changing norms
and beliefs about race. She does not, however,
specify when census policies will be top-down rather
than bottom-up, or even how we would know.
David Kertzerand Dominique Arel provide oneway
to reconcile the two roles, through the idea of “the
locus of power over the construction of identity cat-
egories in the census.”
34 They argue that the locus
of power at a given time depends upon the state’s
goals. Where state power is oriented towards coercion
and control (as with censuses conducted by colonial
countries in the colonies or by slave-owning
nations), the locus of power lies with the state and it
imposes categories as it sees ﬁt. Conversely, where
the state is oriented towards nation-building or incor-
poration of previously excluded groups into full
societal membership, the locus of power shifts
toward the groups subject to classiﬁcation. In these
cases, groups have more opportunity to negotiate
with the state over the form that ethnoracial classiﬁ-
cation will take. As with the logics of discipline and
aspiration, the concept of locus of power in creating
census racial categories is useful for explicating the
American census, but it too does not quite sufﬁce.
For some groups between 1850 and 1930, the loci of
power were multiple and rapidly shifting in ways
Kertzer and Arel’s model does not predict; groups
such as Mexicans and South Asians were switched
back and forth between agency and external
control. Furthermore, none of the three logics expli-
cated so far can explain the proliferation and then
rejection of mixed race categories.
Two other strands of argument about how and why
censuses create racial taxonomies contribute to
explaining our case. Not only state and society, but
also the international context, matters. International
forces are increasingly important in determining
the enumeration of race and ethnicity, given the inter-
est of the United States and international bodies in
securing standardized racial and ethnic data.
35 For
example, a report comparing “the collection of data
to measure the extent and impact of discrimination”
in ﬁve nations describes a European Community
mandate for “the development and dissemination of
comparable statistical series data on the scale of dis-
crimination.”
36 But such forces are not new; around
the turn of the twentieth century, American classiﬁ-
cations of migrants from Asia, Mexico, and much of
Europe were shaped by both direct pressures from
foreign governments and by the indirect conse-
quences of wars and conquests.
Finally, although census taxonomies might be
primarily political in one way or another, they are
not only political. Stanley Lieberson reminds us of
the “devilish principles” of census enumeration of
race and ethnicity, especially the inherent disconnect
between ﬂuid and changing social reality and any
ﬁxed classiﬁcation scheme. This disconnect is exacer-
bated by policy-makers’ natural conservatism:
“census-taking organizations are cautious and not
readily inclined towards making changes in either
the questions or their coded responses.”
37 To the
degree that this claim is persuasive, it makesthe extra-
ordinary degree of racial reorganization between
1850 and 1930 even more anomalous, and in need
of explanation.
31. Naomi Mezey, “Erasure and Recognition: The Census,
Race, and the National Imagination,” Northwestern University Law
Review 97 (2003): 1730.
32. Ibid.; Kim Williams, Mark One or More: Civil Rights in Multi-
racial America (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
33. Victoria Hattam, Ethnic Shadows: Jews, Latinos, and Race
Politics in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
34. David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, Census and Identity: The
Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 27; see also
Jean-Louis Rallu, Victor Piche ´, and Patrick Simon, “De ´mographie
et Ethnicite ´: Une Relation Ambigue,” in De ´mographie: Analyse et
Synthe ´se, ed. Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin, and Guillaume
Wunsch (Paris, France: Institut National d’Etudes
De ´mographiques, 2004), 481–516.
35. Morning, “Ethnic Classiﬁcation in Global Perspective”;
Thompson and Kukutai, “Inside-Out.”
36. European Commission, Comparative Study on the Collection of
Data to Measure the Extent and Impact of Discrimination within the United
States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
(Luxembourg: Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European
Communities, 2004), 5.
37. Stanley Lieberson, “The Enumeration of Ethnic and Racial
Groups in the Census: Some Devilish Principles,” in Challenges of
Measuring an Ethnic World: Science, Politics, and Reality, ed. Joint
Canada-United States Conference on the Measurement of Ethni-
city (Ottowa, Ontario: Statistics Canada and U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1993), 26.
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census taxonomies is the technological limits on
what it is possible to ask, analyze, and report, and in
how much detail. Our period of racial reorganization
corresponded with a period of unprecedented
growth and expansion in the technological capacity
and budgetary resources available to the census. In
1790 the census boasted no permanent ofﬁce staff
and produced only one article-length report. By
1850, it was a respectably institutionalized ofﬁce reas-
sembled every decade, and by 1910 it had acquired
the status of a permanent bureau with a director of
almost Cabinet-level rank. From 1850 through 1930,
the number of enumerators per million residents of
the United States (a rough indicator of quality)
increased ﬁve-fold; the ofﬁce staff, cost per capita,
and number of published pages grew many times
more.
38 Technological capacity, as we will see below,
may not correspond with human, organizational, or
budgetary capacities. But without new technologies,
many of the innovative schemes for racial and
ethnic classiﬁcation would simply not have been
imaginable.
In short, ethnoracial taxonomies may emerge from
a dominant group’s racial ideology, the state’s disci-
plinary control, subordinated groups’ demands for
inclusion and status, international pressures, bureau-
crats’ conservatism, technological feasibility, and
policy concerns or the need for apportionment,
according to the academic literature. We have no
quarrel with any particular argument in this array;
all of these approaches tell us something important
about moments in the history of the American
census between 1850 and 1930. Our quarrel is with
the claim that any one of these characterizations is
the best way to understand the relationship between
a census and a nation’s racial order. Only by under-
standing that the census can be, and has been, used
by many actors for many purposes can we begin to
make sense of its central role in reorganizing the
American racial order between 1850 and 1940.
WHY A GIVEN TAXONOMY IN A PARTICULAR CENSUS?
To supplement the array of extant explanations about
why censuses create particular racial taxonomies, and
toshowwhyAmericancensustaxonomiesweresoinco-
herent, illogical, and unstable between 1850 and 1930,
it is necessary to look inside the institution at the par-
ticular policy makers and policy decisions themselves.
Within a given domestic and international context,
bureaucratic and legislative actors make genuine,
though constrained, choices about racial categoriz-
ation. Their choices, we argue, result from an
unsystematic and ﬂuid mixture of three motivations—
political, scientiﬁc, and ideological. Over the ninety
years of our study, these motivations sometimes
reinforced, sometimes blurred into, and sometimes
conﬂicted with one another, producing a set of
results that can be explained retrospectively but whose
contours could not be predicted a priori.
39
Bypolitical,wemeantwocloselyrelatedphenomena—
the desire for partisan advantage, and the desire
of one institution to control or be autonomous of
another. In particular, we examine the relationship
between Congress and the Census Ofﬁce (later,
Bureau) in order to see how jockeying for the locus
of power between the two bodies affected the racial
categories used byenumerators in the ﬁeld.
40 Byscien-
tiﬁc, we mean the effort by agency analysts to produce
results that warrant approbation from their pro-
fessional peers. This motivation accords well with the
desire for bureaucratic autonomy, but is likely to con-
ﬂict with the urge to create or use data for partisan
advantage.
41 By ideological, we mean agencies’ or poli-
ticians’desiretoreinforceoractupondeepnormative
beliefsabouttheracialorder,whichmayormaynotbe
articulated oreven in the consciousness of the actor.
42
Ideologies can reinforce an agency’s commitment
to professionalism or undermine it.
43 Ideologies
may similarly reinforce partisan loyalties, or compete
with them if a party is mainly a vehicle for jobs and
spoils.
44
As the indeterminacy of that paragraph suggests, we
believe it to be neither possible nor desirable to try to
38. Margo Anderson, ed., Encyclopedia of the U.S. Census
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000); see also A. Ross Eckler, The
Bureau of the Census (New York: Praeger, 1972).
39. William Petersen begins similarly, identifying four factors
that jointly produce particular census policies: science, law (for
apportionment and resource allocation), politics, and expediency,
or “the constant effort to accommodate ﬁscal or technical
restraints” (William Petersen, Ethnicity Counts [New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1997], 71–72). He does not consider
racial ideology.
40. For inter-institutional battles for control, see among many
others, Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Repu-
tations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–
1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Terry
Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” Perspectives on Politics 3
(2005): 215–33; David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating
Powers: ATransaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Sep-
arate Powers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
J. R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, “The Congressional Competition
to Control Delegated Power” Texas Law Review81 (2003):1443–519.
41. Scott Gates and John Brehm, Working, Shirking, and Sabo-
tage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public (Ann Arbor, MI: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1997); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers:
The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1995).
42. Clarissa Hayward, De-Facing Power (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Govern-
ment Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
43. Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative
Behavior(Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1960);John
DiIulio, Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of Correctional Manage-
ment (New York: Free Press, 1987).
44. John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America 1828–1996
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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reinforce, mutually constitute, or contradict one
another. That is a matter of historical contingency and
of the peculiarities of a particular interaction.
45 Never-
theless, understanding speciﬁc policy choices requires
that we try to disentangle the three motivations. In so
doing, we will show what happened both when the
motivations coincided and when one superseded the
others, thereby changing the direction of census classi-
ﬁcation or analysis.
A ﬁnal prefatory note: just as the three motivations
show no linear trend, so racial reorganization as a
whole need not tend in one direction. Whether a
change in classiﬁcation schemes strengthens or
attenuates group-based hierarchy or exclusion, or
does both, is historically contingent. And given that
racial boundaries and statuses are deﬁned relation-
ally, understanding changes in a polity’s racial order
requires simultaneous examination of all groups.
That is our ﬁnal complaint about the extant litera-
ture; most scholars have focused on one or two
groups rather than on the whole system.
46 Excellent
research examines the purported racial science
underlying interest in black-white mixture,
47 or con-
testation over classifying European immigrants.
48
Yet other research ﬁnds inconsistency in census
treatments of Hispanics or of Indians,
49 and incoher-
ence in the treatment of Asians.
50
What is needed, and what we aim to contribute
here, is examination of the dynamics of racial classiﬁ-
cation as a whole—across time and across groups. We
turn to it now, by focusing on “snapshots” of crucial
moments. Each snapshot demonstrates the mixture
of motivations that led to a particular enumeration;
taken together, they show how the categorizations of
all groups collectively created and transformed a
system of racial classiﬁcation. Each snapshot also
suggests how the dynamics of disciplinary control or
aspirations for inclusion operated for a given group
at a given period, and how technology, international
pressures, and bureaucratic stickiness intermittently
contributed to a particular classiﬁcation scheme. By
the time the readerhas absorbed this set of snapshots,
the narrative history of American racial reorganiz-
ation around the turn of the twentieth century
should be clear.
BLACKS, WHITES, AND RACIAL MIXTURE
The U.S. Census Ofﬁce ﬁrst addressed the racial
order in response to the Constitution’s mandate of
a decennial “Enumeration” based on the principle
that “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States ... according
to their respective Numbers, which shall be deter-
mined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, ... and excluding Indians not taxed, three
ﬁfths of all other Persons.” Strictly speaking, the
initial census takers needed only to distinguish free
citizens from slaves (once Indians not taxed were
excluded from enumeration). From the beginning,
however, the census separated whites from “all other
free Persons” as well as from slaves—thus building
racial classiﬁcation into the population counts
needed for Congressional apportionment. The
initial classiﬁcation scheme remained in place with
few changes for the nation’s ﬁrst half century.
Mulattoes in 1850: The law authorizing the 1850
census dramatically expanded the census’s range. It
45. Here we follow the logic of Rogers Smith: the “multiple tra-
ditions approach holds that American political actors have always
promoted civic ideologies that blend ...elements in various combi-
nations. ... [L]aws have always emerged as none too coherent com-
promises among the distinct mixes of civic conceptions advanced
by the more powerful actors in different eras” (Rogers Smith,
Civic Ideals: Conﬂicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History [New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997], 6).
46. Exceptions include William Petersen, “Politics and the
Measurement of Ethnicity,” in The Politics of Numbers, ed. William
Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1987): 187–233; Claudette Bennett, “Racial Categories Used in
the Decennial Censuses, 1790 to the Present,” Government Infor-
mation Quarterly 17 (2000): 161–80; and Sharon Lee, “Racial Classi-
ﬁcations in the US Census: 1890–1990,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16
(1993): 75–94.
47. Nobles, Shades of Citizenship; Heidi Ardizzone, “Red
Blooded Americans: Mulattoes and the Melting Pot in U.S. Racialist
and Nationalist Discourse, 1890–1930” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan, 1997); F. James Davis, Who Is Black?: One Nation’s Deﬁ-
nition (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001);
Christine Hickman, “The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Cat-
egories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census,” Michigan Law
Review 95 (1997): 1161–265; Victoria Grieve, Any Perceptible Trace:
Representations of the “Mulatto” in the United States Census, 1850–
1920 (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1996); Trina Jones,
“Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color,” Duke Law Journal 49
(2000): 1487–557.
48. Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the
Origins of the Diverse Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000); Joel Perlmann, ‘Race or People’: Federal Race Classiﬁ-
cations for Europeans in America, 1898–1913 (Annandale-on-Hudson,
NY: Levy Economics Institute, 2001); Hattam, Ethnic Shadows; Paul
Schor, “Changing Racial Categories: The United States Bureau of
the Census and Racial Minorities, 1900–1940,” Organization of
American Historians, St. Louis, Missouri: 30 Mar.–2 Apr. 2000.
49. Clara Rodriguez, Changing Race: Latinos, the Census, and the
History of Ethnicity in the United States (New York: New York University
Press, 2000); Jose ´ Hernandez, Leo Estrada, and David Alvirez,
“Census Data and the Problem of Conceptually Deﬁning the
Mexican American Population,” Social Science Quarterly 53 (1997):
671–87; Jorge del Pinal, “Treatment and Counting of Latinos in
the Census,” in The Latino Encyclopedia, ed. Richard Chabra ´n and
Rafael Chabra ´n (New York: Marshall Cavendish, 1996).
On American Indians see William Seltzer and Margo
Anderson, Excluding Indians Not Taxed: Federal Censuses and Native-
Americans in the 19th Century. Joint Statistical Meetings, Baltimore
MD: 8–12 Aug. 1999; C. Matthew Snipp, American Indians: The
First of This Land (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989).
50. Martha Hodes, “Fractions and Fictions in the United States
Census of 1890,” in Haunted by Empire: Race and Colonial Intimacies in
North American History, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2006), 240–70; Mezey, “Erasure and Recognition.”
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 66called for statistics on agriculture, manufacture and
industry, commerce, religion, crime, wages, and
other topics. It required information on each
person, rather than merely each household. And it
required the federal marshals gathering these data
to identify “mulattoes.”
The reasons for enumerating mulattoes in 1850 are
complex. The ideological context around any discus-
sion of race was, as all readers know, intensely fraught.
Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, for example, had
sought to use 1840 census data to show that when
freed, “the condition of the African, instead of
being improved, has become worse.”
51 He was refer-
ring to the fact that the 1840 census purportedly
revealed that free blacks were overwhelmingly more
likely to suffer from insanity and other disabilities
than enslaved blacks or whites; controversy over
these results roiled the House of Representatives
and the new American Statistical Association for
months.
In this loaded situation, Sen. Joseph Underwood
(Whig–KY) urged questions to determine the
“degree of removal from pure white and black
races.” He was probably inﬂuenced by Josiah Nott,
the nation’s pre-eminent racial theorist and polyge-
nist.
52 Nott wanted census data in order to show
that mixed-race people had poor fertility and short
lives and to develop life insurance tables.
53 In a
classic case of the politics of strange bedfellows, north-
ern opponents of slavery also sought detailed infor-
mation about individual slaves—in Sen. William
Seward’s (Whig–NY) case, to ﬁnd out “how rapid”
was the “progress” of the African race in the United
States.
54
Other southern senators, however, insisted on
deleting the question about degree of removal
along with others that implicitly recognized slaves as
persons with lives and histories (such as names, chil-
dren born to female slaves, and place of birth).
Race scholars’ and abolitionists’ mixed ideological
and scientiﬁc desire for more data almost entirely
lost out to the politicians’ instinct to avoid feeding
intractable ideological disputes. Nevertheless, after
little discussion, Congress accepted the “Color”
inquiry, specifying the categories of white, black,
and mulatto (identiﬁed by skin tone) for both free
persons and slaves.
Nobles argues that identifying mulattoes brought
Nott’s theories of polygenesis and the degeneracy of
racial mixture into the heart of the American statistical
system. We agree; the new category implied the accept-
ability of such claims about racial rankorderhierarchy,
and imbued them with further ideological and scienti-
ﬁc legitimacy. However, the new census category also
opened questions about racial mixture to examination
by ideologues of all sides; where southerners proposed
enumerating mulattoes for reasons of proﬁt or racial
beliefs, northerners seized the opportunity to gather
informationabouttheslavesysteminordertopromote
emancipation or abolition. In the ﬁrst of many such
instances in the decades of racial reorganization, the
ideological origins of particular classiﬁcation schemes
were buffeted by debate, resistance, and appropriation
from competing normative commitments as well as by
partisan and scientiﬁc motivations.
The debate over the mulatto category was part of a
new effort to systematize census data collection. With
the creation of a Census Board, 1850 marks the ﬁrst
time that Congress solicited, and subjected itself to,
formal input from external expert advisors.
55 Techno-
logical changes and the new discipline of statistics
stood to revolutionize the enterprise of census-taking,
and statisticians, industrialists, and politicians all
clamored for data on an array of features of the
growing American society.
56 Congress thus required
“radical changes in the method and scope of the
census, ... constitut[ing] an epoch in the history of
census taking.”
57 Following the recommendations of
the Census Board, Congressmandateddataonagricul-
ture, manufacture and industry, commerce, religion,
crime,wages,and other topics.Itrequired information
on persons, not merely households. The number of
inquiries on the census form rose from 7 in 1830 to
138 in 1850; questions on population alone increased
from 7 to 22 over that same period.
58 Thus some
may have seen measuring racial mixture as just one
more element in a more precise and accurate demo-
graphic portrait of the nation.
59
51. Qtd. in Nobles, Shades of Citizenship, 33–34.
52. Reginald Horsman, Dr. Nott of Mobile: Southerner, Physician,
and Racial Theorist (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press,
1987).
53.Nobles,Shadesof Citizenship;Anderson, TheAmericanCensus.
54. Qtd. in ibid., 40–41. Diana Magnusonclaimsthat the newly
constituted Census Board, an advisory committee comprised
mainly of eminent Northern statisticians, recommended adding
“color” as well as “degree of removal from pure blood” to the
slave schedule. She does not explain the Board’s purpose, but
nothing suggests that its members endorsed polygenicist racial
science. So several streams may have fed the proposal to identify
racial mixture. Diana Magnuson, “The Making of a Modern
Census: The United States Census of Population, 1790–1940,”
(Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1995).
55. Anderson, The American Census; Magnuson, “Making of a
Modern Census.”
56. Patricia Cohen,ACalculating People: The Spread of Numeracy in
Early America(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1982);Theodore
Porter,TheRiseofStatisticalThinking,1820–1900(Princeton,NJ:Prin-
ceton University Press. 1986).
57. Carroll Wright and William Hunt, The History and Growth of
the United States Census, Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Census
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1900), 47.
58. Ibid., 87. Forty years later, census superintendent Francis
Walker described “the continually expanding detail into which
the traditional classes of statistics will inevitably be drawn, under
the ever-growing popular demand for local and minute infor-
mation” (Francis Walker, “The Eleventh Census of the United
States,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 2 [1888]: 136–37).
59. An ofﬁcialcensus history, forexample, downplayed the role
of ideological and partisan dispute in 1850 in favor of procedural
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stalking horse for polygenist racial science, as a way
for opponents of slavery to learn more about blacks,
as one piece of the statisticians’ omnivorous quest
for knowledge, as the lesser of many evils to southern
politicians, as an acknowledgement of increasing
racial mixture and the distinctive economic and
social position of many mulattoes,
60 as a chip in the
battle over Congressional control of executive
agencies, and as an element of partisan contesta-
tion.
61 Politics, science, and ideology were inextric-
ably mixed, and the process of racial reorganization
was underway—arguably not exactly as anyone
intended.
62
Quadroons and Octoroons in 1890: Despite vast
changes in the American racial order between
1850 and 1880, the next three censuses produced
no revision of the mulatto category (although in
1880, for budgetary reasons, the Census Ofﬁce
published no data on mulattoes). The reason was
probably the simple fact of bureaucratic stickiness.
In 1890, however, the census again dramatically
expanded in size, scope, and budget. It now
boasted a centralized ofﬁce, led by a network of
sophisticated statisticians and social scientists
determined to wrest control from supporters of
political patronage for hiring enumerators, and
to vest the census with scientiﬁc legitimacy. As
Superintendent Robert Porter informed his
boss, the Secretary of the Interior, “The demand
for exact statistics is constantly increasing,
[as is] ... the importance of greater accuracy
and care in securing statistical data of all
kinds.”
63 Cutting-edge technology, including the
wonder of mechanized tabulation, introduced
new possibilities for collating and analyzing data;
the 1880 and 1890 censuses generated well over
20,000 published pages each, compared with less
than 3,500 in 1870.
As in 1850, the expansion included more detail on
racial mixture. With regard to “color or race,” enu-
merators’ instructions speciﬁed:
Be particularly careful to distinguish between
blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons.
The word “black” should be used to describe
those persons who have three-fourths or more
black blood; “mulatto,” those persons who
have from three-eighths to ﬁve-eighths black
blood; “quadroon,” those persons who have
one-fourth black blood; and “octoroon,”
those persons who have one-eighth or any
trace of black blood.
64
No instruction explained how to determine fractions
of black blood.
65
The proximate reason for this new instruction is
reasonably clear, and similar to that of 1850; even
this greatly expanded Census Ofﬁce had relatively
little autonomy and took direction from speciﬁc Con-
gressional mandates. Rep. Joseph Wheeler (D–AL)
proposed in 1888 that data be collected “to ascertain
and exhibit the physical effects upon offspring result-
ing from the amalgamation of human species.” The
census should therefore “publish the birth rate and
death rate among pure whites, and among negroes,
Chinamen, Indians, and half-breeds or hybrids of
any description or character ...as well as of mulat-
toes, quadroons, and octoroons.”
66 Congressional
records say nothing of Wheeler’s purpose. However,
Carroll Wright, the Commissioner of Labor and
acting census superintendent in the late 1880s, sup-
ported the inquiry, arguing that “whether the
and scientiﬁc motivations: “The focal point of the debate was what
level of detailed information to gather about slaves, but the debate
became a debate on the census itself and what wasthe proper reach
of the federal government. At the same time, new questions were
asked that gathered information about schools, crime, churches,
and pauperism” as well as about birthplace of the householder
and his or her parents (General Accounting Ofﬁce, Decennial
Census: Overview of Historical Census Issues [Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Ofﬁce, 1998], 21).
60. Joel Williamson, New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in
the United States (New York: Free Press, 1980); Howard Bodenhorn,
“The Mulatto Advantage: The Biological Consequences of Com-
plexion in Rural Antebellum Virginia,” Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 33 (2002): 21–46; Bodenhorn and Christopher Ruebeck,
“Colorism and African-American Wealth: Evidence from the
Nineteenth-Century South,” Journal of Population Economics 20
(2007): 599–620.
61. On disputes over institutional prerogatives and apportion-
ment, see Anderson, The American Census.
62. After all of the debate, the 1850 Population report made
little use of the mulatto category and contained very little infor-
mation about mulattoes, except for one brief but highly pejorative
footnote by Superintendent Kennedy. The report explained the
paucity of information bureaucratically—the data “not having
been prepared whenthe other facts on population were beingtabu-
lated, could not now be presented in greater detail without expense
anddelay” (U.S.Census Ofﬁce,TheSeventhCensusof theUnitedStates:
1850 [Washington, DC: R. Armstrong, 1853], 63).
63. Annual Report of the Secretary of Interior. 51st Cong. 2nd
Sess., House Exec. Doc. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1889), 2724; qtd. in Magnuson, “Making of a Modern
Census,” 8. See App. Table A2 for information on the expansion
of the scope of the census since its inception.
64. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Measuring America: The Decennial
Censuses From 1790 to 2000 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 2002), 27.
65. As one readerof this article has commented, the silences in
the historical record sometimes speak as loudly as the spoken or
written word. This is one of those occasions; we have no infor-
mation on why there were no clear instructions to enumerators
on how to determine fractions of black blood. Perhaps the
Census Ofﬁce assumed that everyone was practiced in distinguish-
ing fractions of black blood, or it was sohostile to this Congressional
mandate (see below) that it simply refused towaste any unnecessary
resources on an impossible task. Analysis of the 1890 census is made
more difﬁcult by the fact that most of the original schedules for that
year were later destroyed in a ﬁre (Anderson, The American Census).
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11036, A Bill to Ascertain and Exhibit the Physical Effects Upon the Off-
spring Resulting from the Amalgamation of Human Species (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1888), 1.
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 68mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons are disappear-
ing and the race becoming more purely Negro, is a
question which can not be settled by observation. It
must be settled by statistics, and the sooner the stat-
istics are collected the better.” Neither house of Con-
gress discussed the addition, merely noting that this
addition would be “inexpensive” and was “desired
by scientists.”
67
Ideology surely underlay this curious one-time
experiment in measuring the ﬁner gradations of
racial mixture; race scientists continued their peren-
nial interest in showing that mixed-race individuals
were physically, mentally, and morally degenerate.
At the same time, the late 1880s were a period of
efforts to consolidate white supremacy in the south
after losing the Civil War and resisting Reconstruc-
tion. White domination was not as settled during
this time as it retrospectively appears to have been;
there were pockets of genuine contestation over
racial hierarchy, and some blacks still held political
ofﬁce and a little political power.
68 Given its unsettled
state, authorities presumably wanted to know how
much the racial hierarchy needed to be further
reinforced, which depended in part on whether the
number of people blurring the line between the sub-
ordinated and the dominant races was increasing or
decreasing, thriving or struggling, moving toward or
away from whiteness.
Nevertheless, as in 1850, ideology does not
completely explain the addition of quadroon and
octoroon. Wright himself stressed the need for “accu-
rate information—as full as possible” and “statistical
information” on a “question which can not be
settled by observation.”
69 Those are the words of
someone seeking the facts, or at least of someone
who understands that seeking the facts is the best jus-
tiﬁcation for gathering information to support an
ideology.
Nor did the Census Ofﬁce evince any ideological
passion about the data themselves. The 1890 Popu-
lation report barely mentioned the racial hybridity
data except to dismiss them. One table in the
1,000-page volume distinguished all four subsets of
negroes, yet offered no commentary. The intensely
detailed analysis of changing racial proportions in
each state was couched entirely in terms of whites
and negroes. What census ofﬁcials did do with these
data was disavow them. Former Superintendent
Robert Porter’s introduction to the Population
volume was crystal clear on this topic:
The persons of negro descent are furtherclassi-
ﬁed under the law, as follows: negroes,
6,337,980; mulattoes, 956,989; quadroons,
105,135; and octoroons, 69,936. These ﬁgures
are of little value. Indeed, as an indication of
the extent to which the races have mingled,
they are misleading.
70
Porter later observed that “no one, I think, can realise
[sic] the importance of a simple schedule more than
I do. ... Yet the failure ... to realise the ideal [in the
enormously complex 1890 census] was a conspicuous
failure.” His “ideal population schedule” would
include merely ten brief questions; with regard to
race it would inquire only whether the person was
“white, black, Chinese, Japanese, or Indians [sic].”
71
As Porter’s repudiation suggests, the new racial
classiﬁcation arguably did less to solidify the ideologi-
cal commitment to a stratiﬁed racial order than to
open that commitment to scrutiny by people with
alternative ideologies or a competing allegiance to
scientiﬁc rigor. Many leading social scientists con-
curred with Porter that measuring ﬁne inter-racial
gradations was a waste of time. Eminent statistician
Richmond Mayo-Smith, to cite only one example,
wrote that “the extension of the colour division to
quadroon and octoroon seems to me entirely
futile, because the persons interested (belonging to
the old slave class or their descendents) will never
be able to say how much white blood ﬂows in their
veins, and to determine the question by the shade
of colour of the individual would be contrary to
our knowledge of physiological laws.”
72 Most
experts simply ignored the new categories of racial
mixture.
73
In fact, census ofﬁcials and their supporters were
clearly annoyed by this Congressional imposition.
Porter pointedly noted that “the persons of negro
descent are further classiﬁed under the law, as
follows.”
74 Being outside the government, Mayo-
Smith permitted himself more directness:
Additions are made to the [census] schedules
by Congress, but they are either for political
67. Qtd. in Nobles, Shades of Citizenship, 58; see also Ardizzone,
“Red Blooded Americans,” 188.
68. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Careerof Jim Crow, 2d rev. ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Jane Dailey, Glenda
Gilmore, and Bryant Simon, eds. Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics
from Civil War to Civil Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2000).
69. Qtd. in Nobles, Shades of Citizenship, 57–58.
70. U.S. Census Ofﬁce, Report on Population of the United States at
the Eleventh Census: 1890 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1895), xciii.
71. Robert Porter, “The Eleventh United States Census,”
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 57 (1894): 655.
72. Richmond Mayo-Smith, “The Eleventh Census of the
United States.” The Economic Journal 1 (1891): 46, 48.
73. One prominent commentator found the important inno-
vations of the 1890 census to be the “electrical tabulating
machine” and “statistics on the number and amount of mortgages”
(328–29).“The United States Census of 1890,” Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society. 55 (1892): 328–29 (no author). To Porter, its
“most striking feature” was authorization to hire expert statisticians
to supervise and write the special reports—a political claim about
seeking autonomy from Congress and other interferences and a
scientiﬁc bid for professional legitimacy (Porter, “The Eleventh
United States Census,” 644).
74. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
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particular question, and they are often forced
upon the superintendent without regard to
their permanent usefulness or to the danger
of over-burdening the enumerators.
75
Given, for the ﬁrst time, no explicit instructions
from Congress on population enumeration in 1900,
the Census Ofﬁce did what Porter had long wanted,
and dropped all indicators of black-white racial
mixture.
Thus political control by Congress and the ideology
of racial science combined to produce the census’s
multiple measurements of racial mixture in 1890.
The desire for statistical precision underlay the sub-
sequent disavowal of such a socially constructed hod-
gepodge, and growing bureaucratic autonomy
combined with the desire for statistical precision to
permit abandonment of any such measurement a
decade later. Quadroon and octoroon remain in the
historical record only as a failed experiment even
though, as the new century approached, the Ameri-
can racial order remained unsettled on the question
of whether mixed-race individuals were importantly
different from their single-race counterparts.
The Disappearance of Mulatto in 1930: While Con-
gress never again asserted itself on the mulatto cat-
egory, actors within the Census Bureau did. In 1910,
Walter Willcox, a Cornell University statistician and
potent force within the Census Bureau, argued to
reinstate the mulatto category on the grounds that a
“simple” question asking only if the person were of
“pure or mixed blood” would be sufﬁciently accurate
to provide valuable information.
76 He temporarily
won the day; “mulatto” was returned to the census
in 1910, and again in 1920, after which it disappeared.
Why did the mulatto category disappear? The
Census Bureau once again relied on science for its
explanation: “The principal reason for giving up the
attempt to separate blacks and mulattoes was the
fact that results of the attempt in past censuses had
been very imperfect” and “not even approximately
accurate.” Despite all their efforts at precision, the
mulatto increase of 1910 “was probably the result of
the employment of large numbers of Negro enumer-
ators and ... this might explain the decrease in the
percentage mulatto between 1910 and 1920.”
77
Congress’s 1929 Act providing for the 1930 census
ceded control over the content of speciﬁc questions
to the Census Bureau, so it was ofﬁcially free to
choose its path.
78 However, its scientiﬁc explanation
for dropping mulatto in 1930 is at best only partial.
After all, census ofﬁcials had complained for decades
that counts of racial mixture were very imperfect—so
why the change then? The broader context suggests
the importance of changing ideologies about the
racial order, on the part of both whites and blacks.
A crucial clue is the fact that the Census Bureau’s
deletion of attention to racial mixture after almost a
century caused not even a ripple within Congress,
the press, or the academy. The change was a non-
issue, a policy decision reﬂecting new normative
commitments, new laws, and a new conceptualization
of the racial order. By 1930, the American ideology of
white supremacy had reversed course from the turn
of the century’s fascination with racial mixture;
southern states’ recently instituted one-drop-of-blood
rules were migrating into federal statistical systems.
Scholarly attention to racial mixture continued
into the 1930s, and mixture never stopped being
socially and economically salient in black commu-
nities.
79 But mainstream ideology had shifted to a
commitment to bright-line differences between
races in order to maintain white racial purity. The
1930 census reﬂected and solidiﬁed that shift.
80
Blacks were also increasingly committed to a move
from blurred to rigid boundaries, albeit for different
reasons. Although a signiﬁcant segment of light-
skinned blacks continued to afﬁrm the distinctive
classiﬁcation of mulatto, many black leaders had
long claimed that distinguishing blacks from mulat-
toes was conceptually mistaken and destructive of soli-
darity. W. E. B. Du Bois, for example, had urged
census ofﬁcials in 1900 to “class those of African
descent together,” and to accept an expert advisory
panel that included Booker T. Washington and Kelly
Miller, a prominent black sociologist.
81 Du Bois
75. Richmond Mayo-Smith, “On Census Methods,” Political
Science Quarterly 5 (1890): 260.
76. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Special Reports: Supplementary
Analysis and Derivative Tables: Twelfth Census of the United States,
1900 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1906), 189.
77. National Archives, Record Group 29, folder Advisory Com-
mittee 12/14 and 15, 1928 (hereafter RG 29).
78. Eckler, The Bureau of the Census.
79. Edward Reuter, “The American Mulatto,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 140 (1928): 36–43;
Robert Park, “Mentality of Racial Hybrids,” American Journal of Soci-
ology 36 (1931): 534–51; E. Franklin Frazier, “Children in Black and
Mulatto Families,” American Journal of Sociology 39 (1933): 12–29;
Melville Herskovits, “A Critical Discussion of the ‘Mulatto Hypoth-
esis’,” Journal of Negro Education 3 (1934): 389–402; Everett Stone-
quist, “Race Mixture and the Mulatto,” in Race Relations and the
Race Problem: A Deﬁnition and an Analysis, ed. Edgar Thompson
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1939): 246–68.
80. As always, space limitations affected decisions about what to
ask on the population schedule and how to ask it. In 1930 there was
space available on the punch cards for 11 race or color options [for
details and images, see (Truesdell 1965)]. Margo Anderson argues
(note to authors, 24 Jan. 2008) that the introduction of “Mexican”
squeezed the mulatto category out. However, a new “Hawaiian” cat-
egoryappeared on thepunch cardsat thesame time;if mulatto had
retained social and scientiﬁc signiﬁcance, it is unlikely that the
(relatively tiny) Hawaiian category would have been allowed to
supersede it.
81. W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Twelfth Census and the Negro Pro-
blems,” The Southern Workman 29 (1900): 307. The Census Ofﬁce
took Du Bois seriously, judging by the fact that it commissioned
him shortly thereafter to compile and analyze census data on the
state of black agriculture (U.S. Census Ofﬁce, Bulletin 8, Negroes in
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and Miller advocated black unity and erasure of the
line between blacks and mulattoes.
82
Similar views might have found expression within
the Census Bureau. Statistician Charles E. Hall, a
close friend of Miller, worked at the bureau for four
decades. He rose to become the “Specialist in
Negro Statistics” and the highest ranking black
public ofﬁcial in the nation’s capital; the black press
labeled him “The Most Important Washington
Negro.”
83 We found no direct evidence of Hall’s con-
nection with the mulatto category, but he worked
indefatigably to shift the bureau’s focus from moni-
toring and control of the black community through
data collection to direct service to it in order to
foster greater inclusion. His reports emphasized
blacks’ progress through increased literacy, pro-
fessional employment, and purchasing power; he vig-
orously and publicly opposed segregation in federal
agencies and his own unfair treatment with regard
to promotion and salary.
84 Given his racial pride, he
probably opposed the mulatto category. His major
report on Negroes in the United States: 1920–1932
included no mention of mulattoes, in sharp contrast
to the 1918 volume’s full chapter on mulattoes to
which the later volume was intended to be
“supplementary.”
In sum, “mulatto” rose, efﬂoresced, and disap-
peared through a combination of ideology, politics,
and science. Ideological contestation over slavery
merged with Congress’s assertion of control over the
Census Ofﬁce and the ﬁrst stirrings of both racial
and demographic science to bring racial mixture
onto the census. Four decades later, Congress
retained control over an increasingly restive and
stronger Census Ofﬁce—enough control so that ideo-
logical anxiety about racial boundary-blurring and
the robust racial “science” now known as eugenics
was able to have even more impact on census
categories. But the Census Ofﬁce fought back, in
part to promote autonomy from Congressional
patronage-mongers and in part because it was increas-
ingly committed to demographic rigor, which efforts
to measure racial proportions through appearance
violated. By 1930—when whites’ ideology of racial
hierarchy had shifted from obsession with racial
mixture to ofﬁcial denial of its existence, when state
legislatures had ﬁnally sorted out how to implement
one-drop laws, and when most black elites concurred
in preferring bright lines to blurred ones—
experimentation with various categorizations in the
black-white racial order ended in a reorganized and
drastically simpliﬁed hierarchy.
The upshot was a major component of a rede-
ﬁned racial order. After the upheaval of civil war
and emancipation, the census helped Americans
to decide who was to be deﬁned as black or white
and what was entailed by a given deﬁnition. It
gave Americans the information they needed to
realize that black and white are continual rather
than nominal categories and that racial boundaries
are deﬁned rather than discovered. Once Ameri-
cans got a good look at that idea, they turned
their back on it, in favor of legally mandated distinc-
tions between groups that were now ofﬁcially
mutually exclusive. For the rest of the twentieth
century, the classiﬁcation system of the Census
Bureau reinforced the black/white binary pre-
scribed in 1930.
CHINESE, JAPANESE, HINDOOS, AND ASIATICS
Racial classiﬁcation was even more vexed with
respect to Asian immigrants, who began arriving
on the west coast just prior to the Civil War. The
census reﬂected the nation’s perplexity and anxiety
about this population, and provided the categories
according to which the government eventually
resolved it. For Asians, the crucial issue was not
racial mixture but rather the deeper question of
what a race actually is, and who would be allowed
to join the insiders of American society rather than
being excluded or remaining on the margins as per-
ennial foreigners.
Chinese, Sometimes Including Japanese: Census rec-
ognition of people who are today seen as Asian
American ﬁrst appeared in the extra California
state census of 1852, in which a subset of the
white population was identiﬁed in a footnote as
Chinese. (A ﬁre had destroyed some census forms,
so California received a second enumeration.)
The 1860 Population report noted that Chinese
were included with whites in several state tabula-
tions, but “Asiatics” were tabulated separately only
in the state of California. In 1870 “Chinese”
appeared as a color on the main population sche-
dule, along with White, Black, Mulatto, and
the United States [Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1904]).
82. H. L. Mencken later claimed that it was Washington who
persuaded the Census Ofﬁce to drop mixed race categories after
1890 and to “beg[in] calling all colored persons of African blood
Negroes” (H. L. Mencken, “Designations for Colored Folk,” American
Speech 19 [1944], 170, emphasis in original). Miller frequently cas-
tigated white race scientists as well as the Census Bureau’s bungled
efforts to collect data on racial mixture on the grounds that “the
dual caste system is undemocratic and un-Christian enough; to
add a third would be inexcusable compounding of iniquity”
(Kelly Miller, “Review of The Mulatto in the United States,” American
Journal of Sociology 25 [1919]: 220).
83. Rienzi Lemus, “Chas. E. Hall Rated The Most Important
Washington Negro,” Richmond Planet 8 Jan. 1938; Lemus, “Most
Important Negro In Black Cabinet Is Charlie Hall in Dept. of Com-
merce,” (Oklahoma City, OK) Black Dispatch, 8 Jan. 1938.
84. In Charles E. Hall papers, from the personal collection of
Rodney Ross, Archivist, National Archives; see also Desmond King,
“The Racial Bureaucracy,” Governance 12 (1999): 345–77.
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85 “Chinese,” the 1870 Population report
helpfully noted, “for census purposes was held to
embrace Japanese ... but to exclude Hawaiians.”
86
Asian nationalities, along with blurred boundaries
among them, continued to appear at irregular inter-
vals over succeeding decades. By 1920 enumerators
were told to distinguish among Chinese, Japanese,
Filipino, Hindu, Korean, and Other (along with
White, Black and Mulatto), and publications added
categories such as Asian Hawaiians, part Hawaiian,
“Mixed (rather than Chomorro or Polynesian),”
and “Mixed (rather than Filipino).” Census ofﬁcials
never explained why enumeration of these groups
was always based on nationality or racial mixture,
rather than a supra-national racial category like
“Asiatic” or “Mongolian,” in the common terminol-
ogy of the day. Only the 1880 Population report
includes a brief reference to Asiatics as a racial
group including various nationalities. Nor did Con-
gress ever mention Asiatics or any Asian nationality
in any census law in any year. (Congress was without
question interested, however; as a Congressional
report on changes to the 1870 census observed
rather cryptically, “That [inquiry] relating to color
has been made to include distinctively the Chinese,
so as to throw some light on the grave questions
which the arrival of the Celestials among us has
raised.”)
87
As with immigrants from Europe (see below), the
initial inconsistency and confusion on the census
might be explained by the inconsistency and con-
fusion in other ofﬁcial domains. Congressional hear-
ings, for example, show an endless variety of
locutions—Hindostanic Bengalese, Mongolian and
Chinese as racial synonyms, Chinese as a subset of
Mongolian, Chinese and Asiatic as synonyms,
“Hindoos and other Asiatic races” in contrast to the
Chinese, Orientals, and the red, black, and yellow
races, among others.
If the taxonomy was confused, the racial ideology
was not. Politicians’ debate over Asians revolved
around whether any or all could ever move from the
status of perennial foreigners and outsiders, to that
of assimilable immigrants. The Republican party
initially took the latter position, as did former
census director Joseph Kennedy. In 1875, he spoke
at great length and with deep passion about “so mon-
strous a proposition” as the Chinese exclusion bill
before Congress. He invoked, among other argu-
ments, “the philanthropic sentiment of Cicero,”
“the sacredness of contracts,” “the obligations of
law,” “the higher religion we profess,” distastefor “sen-
timents not only so abhorrent to humanity but viola-
tive of principles our fathers came here to plant
and their sons lived to cherish,” and simple
“justice.”
88
But despite Kennedy’s eloquence and his party’s
early support, the open borders that applied to the
rest of the world were not available to many Asian
nationalities by the 1870s. Policy choices ranged only
from carefully controlled quotas and guest worker pro-
grams to complete exclusion.
89 After all, so the claim
went, the Chinese were categorically different from
even the lowliest European immigrants. They were
not in all ways inferior—a central charge, repeated
ad nauseum, was that they worked too hard for too
little pay—but they were “an indigestible mass in the
community” who “do not desire to become citizens
ofthiscountry,andhavenoknowledgeorappreciation
for our institutions.”
90 The Democratic party was
especially hostile to Chinese immigration, and the
ideology behind the Chinese question became inex-
tricably bound up with partisan politics.
91
Antagonism toward the Chinese in particular pro-
vides a clue as to why the census began to distinguish
Asian nationalities (after which point, path depen-
dency, or bureaucratic stickiness, presumably takes
over as an explanation). Many political actors before
the turn of the century argued for Chinese exclusion
on the grounds that the Chinese were radically differ-
ent from the Japanese. A California Senate committee
reported testimony in 1877 that “it is generally sup-
posed that they [Chinese and Japanese] are the
same race; but this is not so. They are of absolutely
different origin, and there is no sympathy, no similarity
between them. ... [T]he Japanese are of Turkish
blood; of the same race as the Turks or Arabians.”
92
85. For more detail, see Mezey, “Erasure and Recognition.”
86. U.S. Census Ofﬁce, The Statistics of the Population of the United
States ... From the Original Returns of the Ninth Census (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1872), xii.
87. U.S. House of Representatives, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., Report
of the Ninth Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1870), 51.
88. Joseph Kennedy, Argument Adverse to the Bills 409 and 477:
U.S. Senate, 45th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Ofﬁce, 1878), 2.
89. Moreover, due to treaty obligations, any policy choice
would need to be negotiated with the Chinese (and later Japanese)
governments. The fact that foreign sovereign powers continued to
claim responsibility for their citizens residing in the United States
arguably enhanced Americans’ perception of Asian immigrants as
foreign subjects, not assimilable new Americans.
90. U.S. Senate, 44th Cong., 2nd sess. Report of the Joint Special
Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration (Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Printing Ofﬁce, 1877), v, vii.
91. On Chinese exclusion see, among other works, Andrew
Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998);
Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control
in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Aris-
tide Zolberg, A Nation by Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2006); Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration
during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2007).
92. U.S. House of Representatives, 45th Cong., 1st sess. Chinese
Immigration: An Address to the People of the United States upon the Social,
Moral, and Political Effect of Chinese Immigration (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1877), 8.
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 72Others agreed that “some similarities of race exist
between ... [Koreans] and Japanese, while the
Chinese are quite singular and unlike.”
93 After all,
unlike the despised Chinese, the Japanese were
Christian, democratic, cultivated, honest, intelligent,
polished, gentlemen, “peaceable, quiet citizens,” the
“Frenchmen of the east.”
94 Japanese were, in short,
assimilable; “those we have here now conform to our
customs. They have become Americanized.”
95
Not surprisingly, then, in 1890 the census distin-
guished Japanese from Chinese. Treating Chinese
and Japanese as separate groups and separating
both from mainstream whiteness reﬂected and
reiﬁed the racial order emerging in the earlier Con-
gressional debates. On the one hand, the Japanese,
in the minds of some at least, had signiﬁcantly
higher status than the Chinese—even approaching
whites (or at least Frenchmen). On the other hand,
both nationalities remained unambiguously non-
white and non-American. Thus both remained
legally on the margins of American society, excluded
from the mainstream by laws prohibiting naturaliz-
ation, interracial marriage, certain forms of property
ownership, and inheritance.
96
Taxonomic confusion over what counts as a race, as
well as the ideological implications of enumerating
distinct Asian nationalities, sat poorly with some
census ofﬁcials. The 1906 Supplementary Analysis on
race noted “little scientiﬁc ground forattempting to dis-
criminate between the Chinese and the Japanese as of
different races. They regard themselves and are
regarded by ethnologists as closely related branches of
the great Mongolian, or yellow, race.”
97 (Unlike other
census analyses, this volume did in fact combine the
two groups into a single Mongolian category.) Further-
more, the distinction by nationality introduced errors
into enumeration; as a census superintendent observed
when the number of Asian nationalities had climbed to
six, “sometimes it is difﬁcult to decide the nationality
even after a personal inspection....We are certainly
trying to gather too much information through the
general enumeration. ...We should certainly be justi-
ﬁed in conﬁning the questions [about “the foreign
element of the population”] to the birthplace and
mother tongue of the person reported.”
98 The drive
for simpliﬁcation and consistency in the deﬁnition of
a race, however, made no headway.
The question of what is a race became even more
confused in the case of South Asians, identiﬁed as
“Hindus” or “Hindoos” (although the majority were,
in fact, Sikhs).
99 After a ﬁrst mention in 1880, they
next appeared in 1910, when tables in the Population
report identiﬁed Hindus, Koreans, Filipinos and a
grand total of eight Maoris along with the Chinese
and Japanese on the population schedule.
100 We
have found no ofﬁcial explanation for the religious
term Hindu as the racial classiﬁcation for a linguisti-
cally and religiously diverse group of immigrants.
101
The Census Bureau did, however, spell out the politi-
cally expedient and decidedly non-scientiﬁc reason
for enumerating Hindus as a type of Asian:
Pure-blood Hindus belong ethnically to the
Caucasian or white race and in several
instances have been ofﬁcially declared to be
white by the United States courts in naturaliz-
ation proceedings. In the United States,
however, the popular conception of the term
“white” is doubtless largely determined by the
fact that the whites in this country are almost
exclusively Caucasians of European origin
and in view of the fact that the Hindus,
whether pure-blood or not, represent a civiliza-
tion distinctly different from that of Europe, it
was thought proper to classify them with non-
white Asiatics.
102
As “distinctly different” cultural outsiders, South
Asians were too foreign to warrant status as whites
or as possible insiders, regardless of their bloodlines.
Within a decade the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Thind echoed the Census Bureau,
and South Asians were formally banned from natura-
lizing as American citizens. Science in this instance
could have served as a counter to ideology, and
could have turned a low-status, excluded group into
93. U.S. Congress, 44th Cong, 2nd Sess. Report of the Joint Special
Committee to Investigate Chinese Immigration (Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Printing Ofﬁce, 1877), 1238.
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Chinese, they might well change their views (e.g. ibid., 342). But
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General Report and Analysis (Washington, DC: Government Printing
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101. The term “Hindu” may have derived from popular termi-
nology for language (“Hindustani”) or geographic location (“Hin-
dustan”), but it is not clear why this term was chosen instead of
other possibilities. Confusion was the dominant feature: for
example, enumerators recorded incorrect language for Punjabi
immigrants (Leonard, Making Ethnic Choices), and Muslim immi-
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proved, however, too weak a force in this intensely
ideological environment.
Enumeration and Identity Cards: We found, in fact,
only one occasion in which the attempt to make the
census a tool of Asian exclusionary ideology failed.
In 1890 a bill that would have required the Census
Ofﬁce to issue an identiﬁcation card to each enumer-
ated Chinese person passed in the House of Repre-
sentatives but failed in the Senate. The card would
be the only proof of legal residency; “any Chinese
person found in the United States without such certi-
ﬁcate shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United
States, and may be deported therefrom.”
103 The bill’s
sponsors were concerned that despite the Chinese
Exclusion Act, “such immigration continues to
come into the United States clandestinely over the
border from Canada and Mexico, and promises to
continue unless effective measures are taken ... to
distinguish those who shall hereafter unlawfully
come into the United States.”
104 In short, the
census was to be the vehicle for identifying those
who are now called illegal aliens.
Proponents argued that “it is undoubtedly the
purpose of this bill to segregate these people by this
enumeration, which shall describe and deﬁne and
limitthem, so thatsubsequent accessionsto this popu-
lation shall be prevented.”
105 Census data could and
should serve ideological and partisan purposes.
Opponents, however, objected that the bill contains
“some provisions of a penal character ... that does
[sic] not belong in a census enumeration. A census
enumeration is to learn who the people are,
who are here.”
106 Sen. James Eustis (D–LA) was the
most eloquent:
It strikes me as a little strange that the Census
Committee, which is a committee charged, as
I understand, with simply the duty of having
the population of this country enumerated ...
should undertake to report to the Senate a
bill which has nothing to do with the question
of census, but has a great deal to do with the
question of not only municipal police, but of
international-law relations and obligations. ...
Why, in the absence of any provocation whatso-
ever, should we provide in taking a census that
this people shall wear a tag like animals?
107
Senator Eustis assured his colleagues that “you have a
race prejudice against these Chinese. So have I. I avow
it. ... [T]here is such a thing as antagonism of races.”
Nevertheless, “if we are to reopen this question of
Chinese exclusion, let it be done in a proper way
and not under disguise and concealment, under the
sham and mockery of taking a census.”
108
The bill failed in the Senate through an alliance
among those who thought it too weak because it left
loopholes for determined Chinese to sneak through,
the few opponents of Chinese exclusion, and those
who objected to using the census for punitive pur-
poses. We found no record of census ofﬁcials’ views
(although one senator reported that the superinten-
dent favored it). To our knowledge, no one tried
again to make the census such an explicit instrument
of surveillance and control until it was used to aid
Japanese internment in World War II. In the case of
Chinese identity tags, although not in the case of
the classiﬁcation system overall, a commitment to
insulate the census and treat it as a neutral scientiﬁc
endeavor won out, just barely, over ideology and
politics.
With this exception, counting Chinese (and later,
other Asian) immigrants was indeed “a mechanism
for imposing order and racial clarity on the prolifer-
ation of an ambiguous alien.”
109 Two features of this
mechanism remained in place to shape the racial
order with regard to Asians throughout the twentieth
century. First, order or clarity never did emerge. The
number of Asian nationalities on census schedules
rose, and later fell; state enumerations used different
categories from national ones; and territorial enumer-
ations (including Hawaii and the Philippines) were
never integrated into the national system. The (incor-
rect) Hindu religious designation appeared, remained
for some decades, and then disappeared. Second,
Asians’placeintheAmericanracialorderwasuniquely
rooted in nationality. To put it more pointedly, nation-
ality was consistently racialized in the case of Asians.
And despite the fact that the Census Bureau and
some elected ofﬁcials realized that social scientists
use “Asian” as a racial category analogous to “black”
and “white,” a combination of ideological exclusivity,
international pressures from various Asian govern-
ments, and bureaucratic stickiness led to the perpetu-
ation of nationality as the designator for Asian
Americans’ place in the United States’ racial order.
Taxonomically speaking, an element of perennial for-
eignness has remained even as Asian Americans’
status in the vertical racial hierarchy has risen.
103. U.S. House of Representatives, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. Enu-
meration of the Chinese Population of the United States (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1890), 1.
104. Ibid.
105. U.S. Senate, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. Congressional Record—
Senate (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1890), 2979.
106. Ibid., 2982.
107. If only to show that partisan politics is never far from
ideology, the Democratic Senator Eustis went on to deplore the
need, if this bill passed, “to have hundreds of additional Republican
enumerators.... If they want to increase the expenditures for this
census and to increase their vast army of enumerators, it can be
done without presenting to the Chinese residents of our country
chromos and engravings. A leather tag would be much cheaper.
I have no doubt that you could buy one for 10 cents and tie it to
a string and let a Chinaman wear it around his neck” (ibid., 2980).
108. Ibid.
109. Mezey, “Erasure and Recognition,” 1730.
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PARENTAGE
“If we were receiving immigrants from the
north of Italy,” he said, “it would be an entirely
different matter, but all the Italians who are
coming in now are coming from the ‘toe’ and
the ‘heel’ of Italy, and from Sicily. You see,
the north of Italy are really Celts like the
French and Irish, being descended from the
Lombards, but the Sicilians and Calabrians
are a mixture of the old pirates, the Moors,
and the degenerated Latin races that were left
when the Roman Empire fell to pieces.”
110
The issue of immigration regained urgency as the
foreign-born population from southern and eastern
Europe soared around the turn of the twentieth
century. How many should be admitted to the
United States, and from where? Where should they
be put in the racial order? Should they be included
at the top of the hierarchy because they could be
deﬁned as white, or in some mid-range because
they were neither black nor Anglo-Saxon? Could
they be treated as potential insiders in the American
mainstream, or were they too perennial outsiders
who could never be fully incorporated? Political
actors turned to census data to ﬁnd categories for
making sense of the new European immigrants and
for information that would help to determine how
the racial order should once again be reorganized.
Providing the Language to Debate the Sources of Social
Turmoil: Every branch of the federal government
and many state and local governments became
embroiled in ideological debates around immigra-
tion—as did the Census Ofﬁce. Census ofﬁcials were
in the front ranks of nativists. To choose only one
example, Francis Walker, the powerful superinten-
dent of the 1870 and 1880 censuses, later described
southern and eastern Europeans in Darwinian
language; they were “beaten men from beaten races;
representing the worst failures in the struggle
for existence.”
111 In contrast to the welcome for
earlier immigrants “descended from the tribes that
met under the oak-trees of old Germany to make
laws and choose chieftains,” the “patriotic American
of to-day may properly shrink in terror from the con-
templation of the vast hordes of ignorant and brutal-
ized peasantry thronging to our shores.”
112 He used
census data (partly from censuses that he had over-
seen) to argue that the native-born white population
was shrinking because Americans were reluctant to
bring children into a world in which they must
engage in unfair competition with undesirable
immigrants.
113
A few people associated with the census rejected
such xenophobia. As we discussed above, former
Superintendent Kennedy challenged Congress’s
proposal to exclude the Chinese by observing (inac-
curately [see note 62]) that “I do not have pleasure,
while considering a question of morals or policy, in
calling attention to the difference in nationality,
color, or creed, and in the forty-three years I have
written on public questions have never done so.” He
nevertheless observed sarcastically that “the great
inﬂux of foreigners at another period from all por-
tions of Europe ...led to alarm for the safetyof Amer-
ican institutions, and some of us are old enough to
recollect that the same political use was then made
of fancied dangers to the entire country which is
now being indulged on the Paciﬁc coast.”
114 His
message: alarm over the “wrong” kind of immigrants
was unnecessary then, and is no more warranted now.
Ideological contestation was made concrete
through political disputes over census categories
and instructions; classiﬁcation “provided, if you will,
the language to debate the sources of the social
turmoil.”
115 By 1880, questions about nativity took
up a quarterof the space on the population schedule.
In subsequent decades, detailed analyses of new
immigrants’ settlement patterns and characteristics
replaced detailed analyses of black migration in the
population reports. One incident reveals the
complex dynamics: after intense lobbying and logrol-
ling, including a conference of all interested parties
called by the census director, Congress required
queries about “mother tongue” (for the foreign-born
and their parents) only one month before enumer-
ation was to start in 1910. Some years later, census
director E. Dana Durand captured the mixed motiv-
ations behind the appearance of mother tongue—
as well as the decided ambivalence of the person
called on to implement what we would now call an
extensive unfunded mandate:
It was recommended by the Director of the
Census [his predecessor], partly on account of
the scientiﬁc value of the information, but
more because of the insistent demand of the
leading representatives of the races coming
from Austria-Hungary. There is no question
thattheinformationwouldbeofmuchscientiﬁc
value if it could be obtained with accuracy and
without unduly burdening the enumerator.
Save with respect to a few countries, however,
...the additional information secured by the
110. Rolt-Wheeler, The Boy with the U.S. Census, 202.
111. Francis Walker, Discussions in Economics and Statistics, vol. 2:
Statistics, National Growth, and Social Economics (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1899), 447.
112. Ibid., 439.
113. Ibid., 417–26; for a refutation, also using census data, see
J. M. Gillette, “Immigration and the Increase of Population in the
United States,” Social Forces 5 (1926): 37–51.
114. Kennedy, Argument Adverse, 7, 12.
115. Anderson, The American Census, 133.
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and expense it causes.
116
Nevertheless, as the next sentence reported with an
air of resignation, “The instructions to enumerators
for 1920 contain a list of 63 principal languages,
and the enumerators are expected to report many
others.”
117 Obtaining information to help in deciding
what to do about the huge inﬂux of immigrants was
too urgent a matter for the federal and state govern-
ments for the small problem of feasibility in imple-
menting new categorizations to stand in the way.
Who and What Is White? From today’s vantage point,
one’s main impression of changing census classiﬁ-
cation schemes with regard to whites is that the dis-
tinct motivations of ideology, partisanship, and
science simply got swamped by the struggle to under-
stand the bewildering array of newcomers. The old
racial order among what we now describe as whites
unraveled by 1910 and it took decades and many
false starts to construct a new one. Even setting
aside large ideological debates about assimilation,
exclusion, and racial hierarchy, questions about categ-
orization were legion: What are the conceptual and
empirical links among country of birth, race, color,
nationality, class, mother tongue, blood, stock, and
peoples? How should distinctive groups be aggre-
gated, and how should aggregated groups be distin-
guished? Where is the line between native- and
foreign-born, and how do populations on both sides
or in the middle differ from one another? How
should one categorize those born at sea or with
parents born at sea, or those born in a nation or
empire that no longer existed?
Congress and the Census Ofﬁce (later, Bureau)
experimented continuously with answers to such
questions. In 1870 and 1880, enumerators were
instructed to provide states instead of Germany (“as
Prussia, Baden” etc.); in 1900, however, they were
told, “Do not write Prussia or Saxony, but
Germany.”
118 In 1890 and 1900, enumerators were
instructed to identify “English” or “French” for
people born “in Canada or Newfoundland;” this
instruction appeared in no other years, despite the
claim that “this is a most important requirement, and
must be closely observed in each case and the distinctions
carefully made.”
119 In 1890, enumerators’ instructions
also included the sentence, “In case the person
speaks Polish, as Poland is not now a country,
inquire whether the birthplace was what is now
known as German Poland or Austrian Poland or
Russian Poland and enter the answer accordingly as
Poland (Ger.), Poland (Aust.), or Poland
(Russ.).”
120 Instructions for categorizing immigrants
occupied a growing number of dense pages as the
bureau struggled to capture with precision the politi-
cal vagaries that produced languages in 1910 such as
Wendish, Lettish, and “Rhaeto-Romanish (including
Ladin and Frilulan),” or nationalities such as
“Turkey in Europe” versus “Turkey in Asia.”
Basic terminology was no more ﬁxed than were
nationality labels. Referring to the decade after
1840, Walker wrote that “for the ﬁrst time in our
history, the people of the free States became
divided into classes. Those classes were natives and
foreigners.”
121 The 1906 Supplementary Analysis on
race noted that the word “race” was “used in
popular speech with much looseness,” and admitted
that the term was even deﬁned differently across the
1900censuspublications.
122In1914thecensusdirec-
tor assayed a different use of the same term; he
described a forthcoming special report on “racial
classes of population,” which did not include
Indians and Negros; the racial classes were distin-
guished by country of origin but were all contained
within the “white population of foreign stock.”
123
The Senate inserted “race” (meaning roughly Euro-
pean ethnicity) into the 1910 census, but the confer-
ence committee between House and Senate deleted
it.
124 The census director explained to a Senate com-
mittee a few months later that “‘race’ in its broadest
sense” should be understood as “ﬁve classiﬁcations,
white, black, Chinese, Japanese, and Indians”—
but another expert witness reported that a person
born in Austria of Polish origin “is German or
some other race—a Pole or a Bohemian” on the
census.
125
One cannot be surprised at the classiﬁcation
muddle when one considers what material the
Census Bureau had to work with.
126 Senate hearings
in 1909 on the upcoming census give a ﬂavor of the
efforts to make sense of these new groups:
Senator Carter: How do you distinguish
between nationality [and] race in your
classiﬁcation? What do you mean by the
word race?
Mr. Husband [Immigration Commission
Secretary]: It is not the racial classiﬁcation
by color that is commonly known but a
116.Memo by Durand,quoted in Steuart,“The Conduct of the
Fourteenth Census,” 574.
117. Ibid., 575.
118. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Measuring America, 15, 37.
119. Ibid., 28. Emphasis in original.
120. Ibid., 37.
121. Walker, Discussions in Economics and Statistics, 424.
122. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Special Reports, 176.
123. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Circular of Information Concern-
ing Tentative Program of the Bureau of the Census. (Washington, DC,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1914), 2, 5.
124. Perlmann, ‘Race or People”
125. Qtd. in Ibid.
126. Senator Dillingham’s Immigration Commission is outside
the purview of this article, but it of course contributed the famous
and then-authoritative Dictionary of Races or Peoples to the mix (U.S.
Immigration Commission, Dictionary of Races or Peoples [Detroit, MI:
Gale Research Co., 1969, orig. 1911]).
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... at least, I understand someone con-
nected with the Smithsonian Institution
worked out the classiﬁcation of races.
Senator Carter: You refer to the Poles as a
race; they are not a race at all. As I under-
stand the word “race,” it is a nationality.
Would you refer to the Irish as a race?
They are not a race; they are part of a race.
And a little later:
Senator Carter: I imagine that in taking the
census they would ﬁnd extreme difﬁculty
in the reﬁnements of the races to which
your remarks refer, Senator Guggenheim.
The Chairman [Senator LaFollette]: Suppose
it were limited to immigrants? I can see
there would be extreme difﬁculty if that
question is asked of everybody. It would
be a question of where the racial lines
should be drawn. Conditions are such
that a great many people could not really
state where they belonged, but if you
limited it strictly to immigrants, that difﬁ-
culty might be avoided. ... I can see
broad ethnological reasons why some
time it would be important to know from
what blood and race the man came.
The issue of self-chosen identity versus external
identiﬁcation also played a role in these deliberations:
Senator Cummins: Do you claim the
Spanish and Italian people as of different
races?
Mr. Husband: Yes ...
Senator Guggenheim: Suppose they were
Jews who came from Spain, would they
be classiﬁed as Jews or Spaniards?
Mr. Husband: That would depend a good
deal on what the man claimed to be.
Senator Guggenheim: I do not think that has
anything to do with it. It is purely a ques-
tion of what is right.
127
They never did sort it out.
By 1930, the classiﬁcatory chaos had settled down,
and the underlying ideology of white supremacy
had been reasserted. Notions of whiteness were con-
solidated: the Census Bureau still enumerated and
provided information on people of mixed parentage
(foreign and native born), but instructions to enu-
merators were much less clotted.
In retrospect, it seems obvious that the speakers of
Lettish and Wendish, the Yiddish-speaking Jews who
demanded classiﬁcation by mother tongue so that
they could be separated from their Austro-Hungarian
rulers, the Poles whose nation had disappeared, those
of mixed parentage or who were unclassiﬁable
becausetheirparentswerebornatsea—allwouldeven-
tuallybefoldedintothecategoryofassimilable“white,”
insiders ranking high on the racial hierarchy. That
outcome probably also seemed clear to at least some
oftheactorsatthetime;thecensusdirector’sﬁveclassi-
ﬁcationsof“raceinits broadestsense”didnot, afterall,
includeanyEuropeannationalities.Butweneedtotake
carenottopredictbackwards.Onecan ﬁndstatements
by inﬂuential senators and public leaders in the 1910s
and 1920s as virulently hostile to new European immi-
grants as any thrown at Chinese, Japanese, or Negroes
a few decades earlier.
128 And the thriving eugenics
movement aimed at least as much at undesirable Euro-
pean immigrants as at already-subordinated blacks or
largely-excluded Asians.
129 Fully incorporating
European immigrants into the status of white in the
American racial order required many years, might
have failed had immigration continued at high levels,
and mightnot have occurredhad censusclassiﬁcations
developed in different directions.
HALF-BREEDS AND FULL-BLOODED INDIANS
Whether Indians would be required to remain on the
outside edge, or could be included as insiders in the
American polity, even if of low status, was contested
from the time that Europeans ﬁrst set foot on what
they labeled “America.” The Constitution’s call for a
decennial census speciﬁed inclusion of “all Indians
taxed” and exclusion of “Indians not taxed.” This dis-
tinction shaped Census Ofﬁce decisions about enu-
merating Native Americans from 1790 onward.
The Social Construction of an Indian: The legal term
“taxed Indians” came to mean those of Native Amer-
ican descent living among whites. Although they were
ﬁrst classiﬁed as white, in 1860 the Census Ofﬁce
instructed enumerators to identify them separately
as Indian. From that point on, the classiﬁcation
system for Indians living in mainstream society
remained stable and unproblematic, even though
the actual counts were highly inaccurate for
decades.
130 Census documents barely mentioned
127. Qtd. in Perlmann, Race or People.
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129. John Haller, Outcasts from Evolution: Scientiﬁc Attitudes of
Racial Inferiority, 1859–1900 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer-
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other small racial groups like the Chinese and Japa-
nese under the heading “Minor Races.”
The question remained, however, of how to racially
categorize taxed Indians with both Native and non-
Native ancestry. The Census Ofﬁce resolved it in a sur-
prisingly pragmatic manner. Superintendent Walker
rejected in 1870 any “analogy ...relating to the
former slave population of the country. The rule
that the child should follow the condition of the
mother was the bad necessity of a bad cause, which
required every point to be construed against
freedom. Something very nearly opposed to this
would seem to be in accordance with the present
spirit of our laws, as well as to be the dictate of
common sense.” Thus he turned to what we now
call social construction; “in the equilibrium produced
by the equal division of blood, the habits, tastes, and
associations of the half-breed are allowed to deter-
mine his gravitation to one class or the other.”
“Persons of part-Indian blood” who lived among
whites, “adopting their habits of life and methods of
industry” should be counted as white, while the
“opposite construction” applied to those “found in
communities composed wholly or mainly of
Indians.”
131
Walker presented this framework as simple
common sense. But underlying it were two profound
ideological assumptions. First, Indians were not like
negroes. Virtually no one depicted mulattoes as any-
thing other than a type of negro, whereas mixed-race
Indians could easily join white society. Thus the hier-
archical dimension of the American racial order dif-
fered for the two groups—a drop of black blood was
a barrier to mainstream incorporation, while a drop
of Indian blood was not.
132 Second, Indians were
not like Chinese. Almost everyone depicted the
Chinese as perennial foreigners, unwilling and
unable to become genuine Americans, whereas if
Indians were willing to “adopt [whites’] habits of
life” and abandon their claims to sovereignty and to
land that white settlers wanted, they were invited to
do so. Thus the census both reﬂected and consoli-
dated the fact that the horizontal dimension of the
American racial order differed between these two low-
status groups.
Walker’s approach towards racially mixed Indians
was by deﬁnition irrelevant to Indians untaxed—
that is, those living on reservations or in tribes
beyond the bounds of white society. The implication
of their racial mixture was a far more contentious
policy issue. In 1876 the Commissioner for Indian
Affairs made the ﬁrst serious attempt to count the
proportion of mixed blood to full-blood Indians.
The Census Ofﬁce followed up with a special census
of untaxed Indians in 1880, in which enumerators
were told to specify what fraction of each person’s
“blood” was white or black, and whether white,
black, or mulatto persons had been adopted into a
tribe. (This enumeration was never completed or
published; Congress cut off appropriations to the
Census Ofﬁce after years of waiting for most results
of the massive 1880 census.
133)
The Dawes Act of 1887 restructured the relation-
ship between the federal government and most tribes,
granting American citizenship to full and mixed-
blooded Indians who “civilized” according to the
terms laid out by the state. It also required the govern-
ment to clearly deﬁne the boundary between white
and Indian. Thus in 1890 Congress again mandated
a special census of Indians untaxed. Despite barriers
of mistrust, misunderstanding, and logistics—
including at least one enumerator’s capture byan out-
raged tribe—the Census Ofﬁce produced ﬁve
elegant, informative, and lavishly illustrated books
on particular tribes, as well as a massive volume with
detailed statistics, state-by-state analyses, and a
history of federal policy towards Indians. Included
in the array of information were data on the blood
quantum of tribal members. (The schedule for the
more racially mixed “Five Civilized Tribes” of Okla-
homa was especially complex, asking whether each
person was white, black, mulatto, quadroon, octor-
oon, Chinese, Japanese, or Indian, with tribe or
clan.) The results were, however, highly unreliable,
as a special report angrily noted:
The separation of Indians from the general
population in the conditions now prevailing
in considerable portions of the country is
exceedingly difﬁcult and unsatisfactory. The
number of persons east of the Mississippi who
would suggest to an enumerator by their
appearance that they have any Indian blood
is very small. Enumerators would be likely to
pass by many who ... lived like the adjacent
whites without any inquiry as to their race,
that these numbers do not describe real people” (Alterman, Count-
ing People, 293).
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other hand, certain legal and proprietary
claims lead persons of very slight Indian
blood connection, or even pure whites by
birth, to call themselves Indian by hereditary
or acquired right, and there are those of pure
white blood who wish to be called Indians, in
order to share in pecuniary advantages, who
are not acknowledged by any tribes. These
Indians for revenue ... constitute a perplexing
element to the courts, to the Indian Ofﬁce, to
the Census Ofﬁcers, and to everyone who
attempts to deal accurately with the conditions
of Indians.
134
In an ideological environment ranging from geno-
cidal hostility to despair over the destruction of great
civilizations, the drive for scientiﬁc precision
stumbled over the socially (and instrumentally) con-
structed realities of race in real life. The effort to
collect valid data was further undermined by the
huge “pecuniaryadvantages” at stakewhich Congress,
the Ofﬁce of Indian Affairs, tribal governments, and
state governments all were vying to control. The ten-
sions could not be resolved; the Census Ofﬁce tried
another special census of untaxed Indians in 1900,
but once again never published the results.
Boas, Dixon, and Racial Mixture: Just over a decade
later, the United States government shifted policy
again. It forced Indians with one half or more white
blood off the tribal rolls established under the
Dawes Act, thus requiring them to forsake tribal
land claims and become subject to federal taxes. At
the same time, a new generation of scholars was chal-
lenging the purported racial science that had pre-
viously undergirded policy towards Indians. The
census was a battleground for this debate, with a sur-
prising outcome.
In a line of research starting in 1894, anthropolo-
gist Franz Boas produced a study that contradicted
his many contemporaries’ claim that race-mixing pro-
duced inferior progeny. In 1899 he called for census
data to answer the pressing policy question of
whether “it is desirable to promote mixture between
the Indians and other races:”
[W]ith the increase in settlement in our
country, the chances for the Indian to survive
as an independent race will become slighter
and slighter. The opinion is frequently held
that half-breeds ... are much inferior in physi-
que, in ability, and in character, to the full-
bloods. But no statistical information is avail-
able which would justify a conclusion of this
character. If there was a decided deterioration
of race, due to mixture, it would seem that
the opportunity for race mixture should be
limited so far as this can be accomplished.
On the other hand, if race mixture seems to
be advantageous, it should be facilitated, par-
ticularly by bringing the Indians into easy
contact with the whites.
135
Nothing came of this call in 1900, but the 1910 special
census of Indians was overseen by Roland Dixon, the
head of Harvard’s anthropology department. Dixon
was a self-proclaimed polygenicist, with no desire to
endorse his former professor Boas’s optimism about
race-mixing.
136Hewasalsoascientist,with nopatience
for social constructivist vagueness, so he provided
excruciatingly exact instructions to enumerators:
If the Indian is a full-blood, write “full” in
column 36, and leave columns 37 and 38
blank. If the Indian is of mixed blood, write
in column 36, 37, and 38 the fractions which
show the proportions of Indian and other
blood, as (column 36, Indian) 3/4, (column
37, white) 1/4, and (column 38, negro) 0.
For Indians of mixed blood all three columns
should be ﬁlled, and the sum, in each case,
should equal 1, as 1/2, 0, 1/2; 3/4, 1/4, 0;
3/4, 1/8, 1/8; etc. Wherever possible, the state-
ment that an Indian is of full blood should be
veriﬁed by inquiry of the older men of the
tribe, as an Indian is sometimes of mixed
blood without knowing it.
137
It is hard to imagine that enumerators followed
these directions to the letter. Nevertheless, when the
datawere compiled, in amazing detail, Dixon asserted
their accuracy and reported without comment a stun-
ning reversal of contemporary conventional wisdom:
“the results of the studies on sterility, on fecundity,
and on vitality all point toward one conclusion, and
that is that the increase of the mixed-blood Indians
is much greater than that of the full-blood Indians.”
Given Darwinian assumptions about the survival of
the ﬁttest, “unless the tendencies now at work
undergo a decided change the full-bloods are des-
tined to form a decreasing proportion of the total
Indian population and ultimately to disappear
altogether.”
138
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falsiﬁability, and thereby rejected his prior commit-
ment to polygenesis in the face of census data
showing the notion of mixed-race degeneracy to be
ﬂat wrong. His is the most dramatic, though not the
only, example of census ofﬁcials’ efforts to distinguish
scientiﬁc inquiry from the intense political and ideo-
logical whirlwinds swirling around and through them.
By the 1930 census, ofﬁcials accepted that categor-
ization as an Indian or part-Indian could not reach
Dixon’s standards of precision. They nevertheless
continued inquiry into blood quantum, justifying it
along sociological rather than biological grounds:
“The sociologist may still be interested in returns
which show the proportion of the tribe who consider
themselves or who are considered by the social group
as full-blood Indians.”
139 To a degree, subsequent
legislation conﬁrmed this sociological framing: the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which redeﬁned
the relationship between tribes and the federal gov-
ernment, also reversed who was to be considered
Indian. It now included all members of recognized
tribes regardless of blood quantum, as well as
anyone living off of a reservation who could claim
more than half Indian ancestry. With that Act, dis-
putes about the location of Indians in the American
racial order shifted away from concerns about
whether individuals could become insiders and rise
in status, to the legal and ﬁnancial relationship
between tribes and the state or federal governments.
The role of the census in deﬁning this element of the
racial order largely disappeared.
THE MEXICAN RACE
During the nineteenth century, the Census Ofﬁce did
not consider the people we now call Latinos or Hispa-
nics to be formally distinct from whites. Congress said
nothing about their classiﬁcation and we have found
no textual discussion in census documents. Census
enumerators did perhaps make attempts of their
own to distinguish them from whites; western states,
especially Colorado, were reported in 1880 to have
an unusually high number of mulattoes despite very
small black populations. Many of the so-called mulat-
toes had Spanish surnames.
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However, classiﬁcation of Mexican Americans
became sharply salient in 1930. The Census Bureau
added “Mexican” to the list of choices in the “Color
or race” inquiry, telling its enumerators that “practi-
cally all Mexican laborers are of a racial mixture difﬁ-
cult to classify, though usually well recognized in the
localities where they are found. In order to obtain
separate ﬁgures for this racial group, it has been
decided that all persons born in Mexico, or having
parents born in Mexico, who are deﬁnitely not
white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese, should
be returned as Mexican.”
That is not an instruction that would satisfy a statis-
tician. Enumerators were not told what to do if the
person was part Negro (or Indian, white, or Asian)
and part Mexican, or if only one parent was born in
Mexico, or if people in the locality disagreed with
one another or the person being counted. The
bureau paid no attention to grandparents, even
though by then state legislatures and courts were con-
sidering third, fourth, and even ﬁfth generation
ancestry in order to determine who was a Negro.
The instruction was vague about whether enumer-
ation as Mexican should be determined by class and
if so, how the class was to be deﬁned (it speciﬁed
“laborers” in the ﬁrst sentence but “persons” in the
second). Most importantly, the bureau ignored the
fact that the United States had by that point
decades of experience and dozens of court cases
showing the impossibility of deciding who is “deﬁ-
nitely not” white, Negro, Asian, or Indian.
A scientiﬁc desire for demographic precision,
therefore, is not a good explanation for the sudden
appearance of Mexican as a racial category on the
census. Instead, the Census Bureau was responding
to political pressure. By the end of the 1920s, nativists
were turning their attention from the now-mostly-
excluded European immigrants to the increasing
population of Mexican residents and migrants. The
1930 Population volume acknowledged the pressure
delicately: “The Mexican element in the population
has increased very rapidly in certain parts of the
United States during the past 10 years. By reason of
its growing importance, it was given a separate classi-
ﬁcation in the census returns for 1930, having been
included for the most part with the white population
at prior censuses.”
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Members of Congress were blunter:
Mr. Johnson: The difﬁculty in enumerating
Mexicans is to enumerate the Americans
born of Mexican ancestors...
marriages” (Earnest Hooton, “Roland Burrage Dixon,” Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Society 75 [1935]: 772).
139. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Indian Population 1930
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1937), 1, 70.
140. Brian Gratton and Myron Gutman, “Hispanics in the
United States, 1850–1990: Estimates of Population Size and
National Origin,” Historical Methods 33 (2000): 137–53; and Schor,
“Mobilising for Pure Prestige?” provides similar data for 1910 and
1920.
141. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population, Volume II: General
Report, Statistics by Subjects (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Ofﬁce, 1933), 27. For discussions of closing the “front door” of
European immigration while leaving open the “back door” of
Mexican migration, see Zolberg, A Nation by Design; Mae Ngai,
Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); David Monte-
jano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836–1986
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).
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Mr. Johnson’s, in regard to what you [the
census director] did with those Mexicans
who came over in swarms.
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Congress had recently relinquished direct control
over the census questionnaire. But members’ views
on this point were clear, and of course Congress
retained the purse strings. It is reasonable to assume
that the appearance of Mexican on the 1930 census
had more to do with the bureau’s political antennae
and the nation’s increasing hostility to Mexicans in
the face of a deepening depression than it had to
do with the drive for scientiﬁc accuracy.
Having accepted the category, census ofﬁcials
sought to convince people that a separate count of
Mexicans could be a source of pride rather than a
means of surveillance. The deputy director, for
example, wrote to a Texas lawyer requesting articles
in local Spanish-language media to promote the
upcoming census. He argued that
if the Mexicans in this country could be con-
vinced of the value of the census work and of
the impossibility of the information they give
being used against them, I believe we could
secure their hearty cooperation. The census
will furnish most valuable material regarding
the number, growth, and economic advance-
ment of the Mexican population in the USA.
This is the ﬁrst census in which Mexicans will
be given a separate classiﬁcation.
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Such efforts were largely in vain; that Texas lawyer
later worked through LULAC (the League of
United Latin American Citizens) to overturn the
1930 Mexican classiﬁcation.
144 And scraps of evi-
dence suggest that census ofﬁcials understood well
the ideological controversy behind the new category
and its implications for those classed as “Mexican”
on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of
the racial order. The census director was cited as
holding the “opinion that the wealthier class of
Mexican call themselves white, whereas the class
of peons will return itself as Mexican.” One
observer noted that “Mexicans are prejudiced
against reporting themselves as something else than
white.”
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They were prescient. Soon after the 1930 census,
the Mexican consul general in New York and the
ambassador in Washington, the Mexican government
itself, Mexican Americans, and LULAC all vigorously
protested the exclusion from whiteness.
146 The new
census enumeration was one of many classiﬁcation
systems that LULAC found unacceptable because
their intent was to “discriminate between the
Mexicans themselves and other members of the
white race, when in truth and fact we are not only a
part and parcel but as well the sum and substance
of the white race.” More pointedly, “Nothing said we
had to be segregated. ... Jim Crow did not apply
to us.”
147
A lot was at stake here. Even if Jim Crow did not for-
mally apply to Mexicans, segregation was vicious in
many communities, and hundreds of thousands of
Mexicans, perhaps half of them United States citizens,
were being “repatriated” to Mexico.
148 Furthermore,
the1924immigrationlawdeniedpermanentresidency
to anyone racially ineligible for naturalization—that is,
to nonwhites (except for Africans).
149 Thus the
countervailing domestic and international political
pressure was strong enough that the Census Bureau
retreated from classifying the “Mexican race.” In
1936, the census director wrote the memorandum
quoted in the ﬁrst epigraph to this article: “The classi-
ﬁcation by race or color of individuals, or even entire
populations, is not only very difﬁcult, but is a very deli-
cate matter to the United States Government, and our
classiﬁcation must always be in accordance with the
policy of the Federal Government.” He concluded
that henceforth “Mexicans are Whites and must be
classiﬁed as ‘White’. This order does not admit of
any further discussion, and must be followed to the
letter.”
150
Racial ideology, in the form of classifying poor
brown-skinned Mexicans as nonwhite and presump-
tively foreign, brought “Mexican” onto the census.
International political pressure took it off. The direc-
tor’s 1936 ruling remained in place, and Mexican
Americans remained ofﬁcially white, even if lower
on the social status hierarchy than European Ameri-
cans. By the time “Mexican” reappeared on the
census decades later (as an ethnicity, not a race),
the chief concern of community leaders was that
too many would identify as white, rather than as
Mexican-American.
142. U.S. House of Representatives, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. Hear-
ings on A Bill to Provide for the Fifteenth and Subsequent Decennial Cen-
suses, Pts. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1928), part. 2, 301.
143. Qtd. in Schor, “Mobilising for Pure Prestige?”, fn. 6.
144. Ibid., 99.
145. Qtd. in Schor, “Changing Racial Categories,” 7.
146. Jacob Siegel and Jeffrey Passel, Coverage of the Hispanic
Population of the United States in the 1970 Census: A Methodological
Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1979), 7.
147. Qtd. in Benjamin Ma ´rquez, LULAC: The Evolution of a
Mexican American Political Organization (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1993), 32–33.
148. Cybelle Fox, The Boundaries of Social Citizenship: Race, Immi-
gration and the American Welfare State, 1900–1950 (Ph.D. diss.,
Harvard University, 2007).
149. Marian Smith, “Other Considerations at Work: The Ques-
tion of Mexican Eligibility to U.S. Naturalization before 1940,” pre-
sented at Organization of American Historians, Memphis TN, 3
Apr. 2003; Ngai, Impossible Subjects; Hattam, Ethnic Shadows.
150. Qtd. in Schor, “Mobilising for Pure Prestige?,” 99–100.
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When through Atlantic and Paciﬁc gateways,
Slavic, Italic, and Mongol hordes threaten the
persistence of an American America, his [the
censustaker’s]isthetask toshow the absorption
of widely diverse peoples, to chronicle the
advancesofcivilization,orpointtheperilsofillit-
erate and alien-tongue communities.
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As we have noted, the almost-century-long exper-
iments in redeﬁning the racial order through
census classiﬁcations largely ended after 1930.
“Mulatto” disappeared; anyone with any black ances-
try was now deemed to be a Negro. The “Mexican
race” disappeared. “Mixed parentage” among whites
disappeared, and “mother tongue” almost did.
Asian nationalities remained in place, but the list
stopped growing and even shrank in some years. Frac-
tions of white or black blood among Indians
remained on special census schedules for a few
more decades, but received little attention.
Why did census experimentation with reorganizing
the racial order begin and end when it did? For ﬁfty
years before 1850 and sixty years after 1930, the
census’s racial taxonomy was less unstable; but
between those years the meaning of race, boundaries
between races, and subdivisions within races changed
almost every decade for almost every group. Some-
times the classiﬁcation of individuals was also
changed. We have shown the many proximate
causes of that variability, but underlying all of it was
one fact—the extraordinary transformation of the
American state and its population over this period.
Consider the following events. Any one would have
been somewhat destabilizing; taken together, they
show a profound breadth and depth of alteration in
the very meaning of the United States. Together
they constituted the demographic upheaval that is
reﬂected in the reorganization of the racial order
described above.
As readers know, race-based slavery was coming
under increasing attack in 1850 and was abolished
before 1870. The polity, as well as the four million
previously-enslaved African Americans, needed to
ﬁgure out how they would be incorporated into the
American state. Emancipation entailed physical
migration, political incorporation and then disfranch-
isement, radical economic disruption and then the
simultaneous growth of both a new system of share-
cropping and a small black middle class, the slow
invention of Jim Crow segregation, a degree of cul-
tural innovation, and the eventual formalization of
one-drop-of-blood laws in many states. How to under-
stand and respond to racial mixture was a central
element of the debate over terms of incorporation,
and the Census Bureau, as we have seen, was the
agency to which people turned for crucial
information.
Also starting around 1850 and continuing through
the early twentieth century, both the size of the Amer-
ican population and immigration dramatically
increased. From 1880 to 1930, between four and
eight million new residents arrived in the United
States per decade, during an era in which the total
American population rose from 50 to 123 million.
So the country more than doubled in size—and
still immigration reached about 15 percent of the
Americanpopulationformanyyearsinthosedecades.
From 1900 through 1920, almost 40 percent of resi-
dents of New York City were foreign-born, and
about the same proportion of whites (who comprised
virtually all of the population) were children of
immigrants. Nor was New York City unique; about
three-quarters of the residents of other large cities
such as Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Providence,
and Detroit were born outside the United States
or were children of foreign-born parents.
152 The
census’s increased attention to country of birth,
mixed parentage, native tongue, and other features
of immigration provided one resource for making
sense of this reconﬁguration of the nation.
Not only were newcomers pouring into the nation,
but also, as we have seen, they were coming from
places perceived to be dangerously foreign. Chinese
immigrants comprised 10% of the non-Indian popu-
lation of California in 1870, and they were followed
by workers and migrants from other Asian nations
and from ambiguously classiﬁed countries such as
Afghanistan or Iran. Mexicans increasingly migrated
acrossthe southwestern border towork in agriculture,
railroad construction, and nascent industries. The
apparent threat from Chinese, and later Japanese
and other Asians, was ruthlessly dealt with. But the
“beaten men from beaten races” of southern and
eastern Europe were a larger national issue. In 1850,
most immigrants came from Great Britain, Ireland,
and Germany; by 1910, a majority of the rapidly
increasing population of immigrants were arriving
from the Austro-Hungarian empire, Italy, and
Russia. They were white, at least in the sense that
they were not black or “Asiatic”—but only marginally
and questionably so. Their capacity to work and bear
children was undoubted; their ability to become good
democratic citizens remained in severe doubt in the
eyes of many native-born Americans. As Figure 1
151. Rolt-Wheeler, The Boy with the U.S. Census, Preface.
152. Richard Alba and Nancy Denton, “Old and New Land-
scapes of Diversity: The Residential Patterns of Immigrant Min-
orities,” in Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States,
ed. Nancy Foner and George Fredrickson (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2004); Ellen Kraly and Charles Hirschman,
“Immigrants, Cities, and Opportunities: Some Historical Insights
from Social Demography,” in The Immigration Experience in the
United States: Policy Implications, ed. Mary Powers and John
Macisco, Jr. (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1994).
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 82Fig. 1. Year of Immigration of the Foreign Born, by Country of Birth (1930)
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population, Volume II: General Report, Statistics by Subjects (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1933), 497.
RACIAL REORGANIZATION AND THE UNITED STATES CENSUS 1850–1930 83Fig. 2. Distribution of the Population (1870), Excluding Indians Not Taxed
Source: First published in U.S. Census Ofﬁce, Tenth Census of the United States 1880, Population Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce,
1883), xix.
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4shows, the Census Bureau was keeping very careful
track of who was migrating to the United States
from where in Europe, and at what pace; it developed
new forms of statistical analysis and graphical display
in order to show this information most clearly.
In the same decades, the United States was
engaged in digesting the huge tracts of land it had
recently acquired from Mexico, with residents who
needed to be incorporated in some fashion into
American citizenship. These territories, and other
acquisitions in the west and northwest, completely
altered the geography and political dynamics of the
nation. In 1840, the twenty-six states plus District of
Columbia occupied about 910,000 square miles; by
1850, ﬁve new states added 580,000 more square
miles. Over the next six decades, seventeen more
states were admitted to the union, transforming the
governance structure and representational systems
of the nation and more than doubling the American
land mass by adding 1.8 million square miles.
153
Census maps became increasingly detailed, sophisti-
cated, and attentive to the geography of group
density over the last few decades of the nineteenth
century, as ﬁgure 2 demonstrates.
While huge swaths of land were being acquired and
organized into territories and then states, Americans
were moving into them at a rapid rate. Between 1870
and 1930, about a quarter of Americans moved from
the state in which they were born.
154 People were also
moving from rural areas into cities at a very rapid rate;
“intercounty migration rates may have been more
than 25 percent higher in the 1850s than they were
from the 1950s onward.”
155 So the Census Bureau
needed to deal with very high rates of physical mobi-
lity at the same time that the population itself was
growing, changing at unprecedented rates, and
moving into vast new territory. As Figure 3 shows,
the Census Ofﬁce carefully monitored and graphi-
cally displayed westward migration.
Still over the same decades, between 1850 and
1930, treatment of and policies with regard to
Indians reversed course several times—from exclu-
sion through forced migration westward, contain-
ment on reservations, proposed assimilation
(through individual land ownership, schooling away
from reservations, and formal grants of citizenship),
stripping of reservation lands, and eventually to a
commitment to engage with tribes as semi-sovereign
though dependent nations.
156 The population of
Indians itself was declining rapidly, due to disease,
intermarriage, and general maltreatment. In addition
to the careful delineation of Indian reservations, as
shown in ﬁgure 2, the Census Ofﬁce produced beau-
tiful, detailed, and amazingly informative volumes on
Indian tribes, and later on the Indian population as a
whole.
Still at the same time, the United States acquired
the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, American
Samoa, and others. The populations were small but
the acquisitions were signiﬁcant for the Census
Bureau because it needed to reconcile census cat-
egories and data for each territory with census cat-
egories and data from the continental United States
(it never entirely managed to do so).
In short, dramatic changes occurred in the size,
national origins, and physical mobility of the popu-
lation; the geographic scale of the nation; the legal
status of blacks, Indians, Asians, and other groups;
the institutional structure of American governance
and the practice of democratic representation; and
relations with nationalities or territories outside the
boundaries of the state. Many of these changes
occurred more than once, moving in differing direc-
tions. Readers of this article know all of this, but we
believe that scholars of American political develop-
ment, or at least scholars of the racial order, have
taken insufﬁcient account of the magnitude and
complex simultaneity of these alterations. The
crucial point here is that public ofﬁcials connected
with the census necessarily struggled mightily to
ride this wave of transformation, endeavoring to
control it through new taxonomies, more complete
enumeration, and more sophisticated analyses. We
should not be surprised that the Census Bureau
failed for almost a century to articulate a stable
racial order; what is surprising is that the whole
system of census-taking did not simply disintegrate
under the impact of centrifugal forces.
It is exceedingly difﬁcult in retrospect to get a
sense of how much demographic and political trans-
formation occurred during these ninety years. To
help us do so, consider the following thought exper-
iment: Imagine that in the period from 1950
through 2030, the following events all transpired or
will transpire:
† Antagonisms growing out of the civil rights move-
ment, counterculture, and/or views of the
Vietnam war grew into a horrendously violent
civil war during the 1960s, in which over three
million young men died;
157 153. Authors’ calculations from Richard Sutch and Susan
Carter, eds. Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to
the Present, Millennial Edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006), table Cf8–64; these ﬁgures do not include terri-
tories outside the continental United States.
154. Ibid., table Ac1–42.
155. Joseph Ferrie, “Internal Migration,” in Historical Statistics of
the United States, 1:493.
156. Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimi-
late the Indians, 1880–1920 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press, 2001); Snipp, American Indians.
157. Over 600,000men died in the AmericanCivil War, out ofa
population of 31,000,000. The same proportion of casualties
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and formal segregation to full legal citizenship,
and then lose most of that ground until a
majority end up comprising an urban
“underclass”;
† The United States acquires 1.8 million square miles
from Canada or Mexico;
158
† Immigration increased dramatically after the 1965
immigration law, so that during the 21
st century
immigrants comprise more than 15 percent of
the American population and their children com-
prise another 15 percent or more;
† U.S.-occupied military bases around the world are
declared to be American territories, and the
United States goes to war to defend that
declaration. All of their populations are now to
be included in census enumerations;
† Middle Easterners, or Muslims, are no longer per-
mitted to immigrate into the United States, and
those already here are denied the right to
become naturalized citizens and are uniquely
subject to certain legal restrictions;
† All illegal immigrants (roughly 12 million at
present) are deported, and any land or property
that they had acquired is seized or bought at rock-
bottom bargain rates; and
† Over 50 million Americans move from the state in
which they were born, most from rural or suburban
areas into cities.
A few of these events are close to reality (the
immigration and migration rates, the persistence of
deep poverty in some predominantly black urban
areas). But of course most have not transpired and
will not do so. We offer this list not as anything
resembling a prediction or retrospection, but
rather as a way to drive home the magnitude of
Fig. 3. Center of Population, 1790–1900
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Atlas (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1903), Plate 16.
(almost 2 percent) implies a mortality rate of well over 3,000,000 for
the 1960 population of over 179,000,000.
158. Alternatively, if one considers relative rather than absolute
increases in size, the United States increases in size from its current
3.7 million to over 8 million square miles.
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encountered by the United States a century ago.
And that list, of course, says nothing about industri-
alization, technological change, foreign policy or any
other major changes that also affect census data
collection.
Even this rather fanciful counterfactual scenario
does not capture the magnitude of the stress that
the Census Bureau faced over the decades of trans-
formation. For the ﬁrst half of our period, it was a
weak agency, regularly disbanded and reconstituted
with new personnel and no institutional memory.
As Superintendent Walker wrote in 1891, “The
strain upon the nerves and the vital force of whom-
soever is in charge of the census is something appal-
ling. ...Taking a Census of the United States under
the present system, and upon the existing scale, is
like ﬁghting a battle every day of the week and
every week for several months.”
159 The community
of social scientists, statisticians, demographers,
business executives, public ofﬁcials, advocacy and
interest groups, and others who now regularly rely
on census data and protect its integrity—though
not without controversy and tension—was just begin-
ning to come into existence. So the bureau lacked
the protection of a committed constituency.
160 In
addition, for most of the nineteenth century Con-
gress treated census enumeration as an opportunity
for partisan patronage, and well into the twentieth
century racial scientists sought to use it to bolster
their pet theories. So the demographic and political
upheaval would have been even more difﬁcult to
deal with then than the equivalent alterations
suggested by our counterfactual history would be
now.
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By 1940, all of this demographic transformation
ceased. The frontier was ofﬁcially closed. Immigra-
tion from all of Asia, extending into what we now
call the Middle East, was prohibited. The Supreme
Court issued two rulings that set boundaries on who
could be deemed “white.” Immigration from Europe
was cut to a small fraction of its former levels, with
most quotas given to Northern European nations.
Indians were decimated and either conﬁned to reser-
vations, which were a fraction of their former sizes
and a tiny proportion of the original land held by
tribes, or incorporated in some fashion into main-
stream society. No new states were admitted until
the 1950s. No new territories were acquired. Mexicans
remained ofﬁcially white and were still permitted to
migrate across the border for work, but their
movements were increasingly regulated and they
were subject to “repatriation” (including American
citizens). Internal migration continued, but at lower
levels. Southern and border states completed legislat-
ing one-drop-of-blood laws for African Americans and
put the ﬁnal touches on Jim Crow segregation. The
eugenics movement and scientiﬁc interest in racial
mixture were losing public respectability in the face
of Nazism.
Experiments in racial reorganization stopped
when the demographic and institutional transform-
ations of the previous nine decades also ceased.
The Census Bureau no longer needed to measure
and record racial mixture among blacks, given
one-drop legislation. It no longer needed to
measure and record mixed parentage and mother
tongue among whites, given the 1924 Immigration
Act. It no longer was permitted to record members
of the Mexican race; there was no such thing.
Given Asian exclusion, the Census Bureau no
longer needed to add new Asian nationalities to its
counts, and in fact was able to delete a few. Given
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, attention to
the racial characteristics of individual Native Ameri-
cans became less important. The racial order
settled on a few mutually exhaustive and exclusive
categories—white, Negro, Indian, and several Asian
nationalities. Each could be clearly and consensually
ﬁxed in both the vertical dimension of status and
the horizontal dimension of American-ness. There
things remained for several decades, frozen at the
moment when the power of anti-black racism and
anti-foreigner xenophobia had both reached their
peak in modern American history.
CONCLUSION
But few persons recognize the importance of
care in the wording of the census schedules.
—Census Director William Steuart
It is possible that, by 2050, today’s racial and
ethnic categories will no longer be in use.
—Migration News, 2004
162
For most of American history, a person’s racial classi-
ﬁcation largely shaped his or her social status, civil
rights, economic opportunities, political standing,
and legal citizenship. The important task of deciding
whether and where new populations ﬁt into the
American racial order, along both horizontal and ver-
tical dimensions, involved institutions from the local
to the federal level—including the national census. 159. Qtd. in James Phinney Munroe, A Life of Francis Amasa
Walker (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923), 197–98.
160. However, see Magnuson, “Making of a Modern Census”
on the constituency pressures that it did face.
161. Our thanks, here and elsewhere, to Kenneth Prewitt for
giving us the census-eye view of material that we tend to approach
from our vantage point as social scientists.
162. Steuart, “Conduct of the Fourteenth Census,” 572;
Migration News, “Census, Welfare, California, New York City,” Uni-
versity of California, Davis, 22 Dec. 2004. Accessible at: http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/.
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necessary nor sufﬁcient to create (or destroy) group
hierarchy, but they play a special role in the construc-
tion of racial orders in the four ways we described
earlier in this article.
Why These Taxonomies, and Why Did They Start and
Stop? A census bureau engages in that construction
within a domestic, international, and institutional
environment. But macro-level explanations cannot
explain why the American racial taxonomy was
revised in so many distinctive and inconsistent ways
every decade from 1850 to 1930. Nor can macro-level
explanations fully make sense of the system that was
consolidated by 1940. Within a deeply racist and
xenophobic context, that system deﬁned racial
groups in a haphazard way—some by color (blacks
and whites), some by nationality (Chinese and Japa-
nese), some by ethnicity and tribe (Indians), and
some by ignoring socially recognized ethnicity and
color (Mexicans). As we have shown, understanding
these particular changes requires looking inside the
institution itself at the Census Bureau’s struggles
over bureaucratic control and autonomy, drive for
scientiﬁc legitimacy, and ideological commitments
about the nature of race.
We see no reason to think that any one or two of
these motivations is gaining ascendancy over the
other(s). Analysts mostly concur that the Census
Bureau has become a more powerful and auton-
omous agency with the passing decades and centu-
ries, as Appendix Table A2 would suggest. But it
never has moved and presumably never will move
out from under the scrutiny and intervention of the
rest of the executive branch and Congress. Even the
Supreme Court has moved into the business of count-
ing the population—in fact, more now than in
decades past (e.g., Utah v. Evans, 2002). Similarly,
the bureau’s level of demographic and statistical
sophistication is impressive, and census demogra-
phers are tightly connected with their academic and
professional peers—but census classiﬁcation systems
are under just as much political pressure as a
century ago. Census ofﬁcials struggle to ignore ideo-
logical commitments—their own as well as those of
Congress or other actors—but they recognize the
impossibility of ever fully doing so. Decisions about
racial classiﬁcation and enumeration presumably
will always result from a mixture of politics, science,
and ideology; the issues are too important, too com-
plicated, and too fraught to anticipate otherwise.
What macro-level explanations can best do is
explain why instability in the census racial taxonomies
arose and declined when it did. After all, census cat-
egories were quite stable for the ﬁve decades before
1850 and the six decades after 1930—sowhy the inter-
vening era? The politics of demography provided our
answer; before 1850 and after 1930, there was little
experimentation in racial classiﬁcation because
demographic pressures could be managed in terms
of the existing racial order. That was not the case
from the ante-bellum period to the Great Depression.
The Re-emergence of Taxonomic Experimentation: That
point opens the issue of the contemporary American
census. It is once again increasingly unstable and
inconsistent—largely because, as one might expect
from the analysis in this article, the United States is
once again experiencing considerable demographic
change to which it must respond institutionally. The
most compelling question about the current era is
whether demographic and political pressures are
strong enough to undermine the two-dimensional
logic of the American racial order–or whether they
will, as in the past, mainly rearrange groups’ locations
in that order.
Five phenomena shape the current era of exper-
imentation in racial taxonomies. Three have to do
with the population being classiﬁed, and two with
the classiﬁers. The ﬁrst is a rise in immigration after
the 1965 Immigration Act that in some years and
some locations rivals the scope of a century ago. As
then, immigrants are coming from nations that are
not considered to be white or are only marginally
so, and the same anxieties about assimilation and
foreigners’ impact on democratic governance are sur-
facing. The second phenomenon is the growth of
multiracialism both demographically and politically.
Rising immigration, the 1967 abolition of anti-
miscegenation laws (Loving v. Virginia 1967), and
increased integration in such institutions as the mili-
tary and universities have created conditions under
which racial intermarriage is rising rapidly. The
number of interracial couples has grown 7.5 percent
annually since 1960;
163 as of 2000, about 14 percent
of children living in a married couple family had
parents who differed in race.
164 (Those ﬁgures do
not include marriages between Hispanics and
others, or children with one Hispanic parent.) Simul-
taneously, a multiracial movement that asserts individ-
uals’ right to publicly and ofﬁcially identify with more
than one race or as “multiracial,” including on the
census, has developed. The third phenomenon is
more amorphous, and may best be labeled “identity
politics.” Among its many features, the relevant one
here is that groups—understood as races, ethnicities,
or nationalities—are increasingly eager to assert their
public visibility, and to demand what they perceive to
be their rightful recognition or share of governmen-
tal resources.
The other two phenomena have to do with the clas-
siﬁers, not the classiﬁed. Census ofﬁcials can no
163. ESRI “Trends in the U.S. Multiracial Population from
1990–2000” (ESRI, 2005). Accessible at: www.esri.com/data/
resources/literature.html.
164.ReynoldsFarley, “The Declining MultipleRace Population
of the United States: The American Community Survey, 2000–
2005,” presented at Population Association of America, New York
City, 29–31 Mar. 2007.
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 88longer assert with a straight face that “statistics ...if
they are patiently and faithfully collected, judiciously
arranged and applied, and wisely digested,... lead to a
morepositiveknowledgeoftherealstateofthings.”
165As
late as 1972, a former Bureau director could assert that
“the ﬁrst element in the creed of a statistical agency is
abeliefintheimportanceofobjectivemeasurement.”
166
But the Ofﬁce of Management and the Budget (OMB)
now ofﬁcially recognizes that “the categories [on the
U.S. Census] represent a social-political construct
designed for collecting data on the race and ethnicity
of broad population groups in this country, and are
not anthropologically or scientiﬁcally based.”
167 Thus
census ofﬁcials are in the uncomfortable position of
seekingtoprovidedemographicprecisionforasetofcat-
egories that they know are invented and changeable,
rather than discovered and ﬁxed.
Finally, racial and ethnic groups are now active par-
ticipants in creating, no longer helpless recipients of,
any taxonomic scheme. The degree of helplessness
varied in the past, of course, across groups and over
time, but the promoters of “mother tongue” and
the challengers of the “Mexican race” were the excep-
tion rather the rule. By now, active and energetic advi-
sory bodies represent all minority groups, as
commonly understood, to the Census Bureau, while
members of Congress and advocacy organizations
look out for their interests in a way that was inconcei-
vable around the turn of the twentieth century.
These ﬁve phenomena are elaborately linked in
ways that we cannot develop here. Sufﬁce it to say
that in combination, they are having and will con-
tinue to have a signiﬁcant impact on census racial
taxonomies. Consider the relevant questions in
Figure 4, from the 2000 census.
Several features are distinctive. First, one’s popu-
lation group is self-identiﬁed (as it has been since
1970), so there is relatively little risk that a person
will be labeled in a way that he or she ﬁnds mistaken
or offensive. Second, Hispanic ethnicity (but no
other) is identiﬁed separately from race and antece-
dent to it, with a combination of nationality, identity-
based, and panethnic terms.
168 Third, everyone
(including Hispanics) can choose more than one
race. Fourth, roughly three-fourths of the population
are identiﬁed by only one color-based term—
“white”—while tiny fractions of the population are
identiﬁed by nationality (Native Hawaiian, Guama-
nian or Chamorro, Samoan). There continues to be
no panethnic or racial label for Asians on the
census form itself. Uniquely among federal agencies,
the Census Bureau was permitted (in 2000) or is
required (in 2010) to include “Some other race” as
one racial option. In a personal communication to
the authors, as one knowledgeable observer has put
it, racial categories on the census are a “rat’s nest.”
Obviously, the census form is still shaped by politics
and ideologyasmuch asbyanalysts’ desire foraccurate
and complete data. Just as ﬁgure 1 demonstrates the
nation’s anxiety about the nationality of European
immigrants in 1920, ﬁgure 4 demonstrates the
nation’s current almost complete indifference to Eur-
opeans but great concern about Asians and Paciﬁc
Islanders. Hispanic advocacy groups and advisory com-
mittees prefer to keep Hispanicity isolated from race,
and to ask about it ﬁrst, in order to maximize the
number of responses to that question. Asian
members of Congress are responsible for the multi-
tude of Asian and Paciﬁc Islander categories, and a
Hispanic Representative preserved “Some other race”
so that Hispanics would not need to choose one of
Fig. 4. 2000 Census Form, Race and Ethnicity
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Questionnaire.
165. Francis Lieber, 1836 Memorial to Congress. Qtd. in Mag-
nuson, “Making of a Modern Census,” 25.
166. Eckler, The Bureau of the Census, 121.
167. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, Revisions to the Stan-
dards for the Classiﬁcation of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity
(Washington, DC: Executive Ofﬁce of the President, OMB Ofﬁce
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 1997).
168. Hispanicity returned to the national census in 1970, when
a 5 percent sample was asked if their “origin or descent” were
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or
Other Spanish. The full population was asked about “Spanish/
Hispanicorigin or descent”in 1980, with answercategories identify-
ing three nationalities (one of which was “Mexican,
Mexican-American, Chicano”). In 1990, additional nationalities
appeared as examples of “other Spanish/Hispanic.” In short, His-
panic ethnicity on recent censuses encompasses nationality,
panethnicity, continent, political identity (“Chicano”), and a catch-
all “other.”
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American advocacy groups inﬂuenced, though they
did not determine, the OMB’s choice of “mark one
or more” rather than a separate “multiracial” category.
Nevertheless, despite the obvious social constructed-
ness of the categories, all of these items were exten-
sively and carefully pretested before census 2000,
alongwithavarietyofalternativeformulationsandpre-
sentations, in order to ensure the greatest possible
scientiﬁc reliability and external validity.
What remains to be seen is what happens if the
demography of the United States continues to
change dramatically and if the federal government
continues to be buffeted by both advocacy groups
and its own recognition of the contingent nature of
classiﬁcation systems. Will the ethnoracial pentagon
that most living Americans grew up with—black,
white, Asian, Indian, and Latino—crumble? Even
the sober and cautious Migration News observed in
an uncharacteristic burst of speculation, “It is possible
that, by 2050, today’s racial and ethnic categories will
no longer be in use.” Afterall, the census now permits
126 racial and ethnic combinations—which is way too
many to be useful—and there is nothing but OMB’s
choice to prevent more nationalities (Arab?) or ethni-
cities (Middle Eastern?) from being added. The
system has both too many and too few categories.
169
But whether demographic change and the political
pressures it induces are enough, given the changes
in the political climate and in groups’ legal standing
since the 1960s, to deeply disrupt the American
racial order as a whole remains to be seen.
“More Research is Needed:” It always is—but perhaps
especially for what we see as a novel arena of investi-
gation. We envision several directions for future inves-
tigation, in addition to simply watching to seewhether
the United States’ new round of taxonomic exper-
imentation turns into a genuine upheaval.
First, the subject of this article could be investigated
more deeply and broadly. Can anything more be
learned about the silences in the census record
through further archival research or informed specu-
lation? What inﬂuence, if any, did censuses in other
nations, newly-acquired territories, or American states
have on the national census? What role did courts,
state legislatures, pressure groups, experts, foreign gov-
ernments, and other contextual elements play in chan-
gingcensuspractices?Howwerethesecensusdataused?
Second, the political and substantive role of
national censuses has only recently been theorized,
and much work remainsto be done. What determines
whether states embrace or shy away from elaborate
ethnic and racial classiﬁcation schemes? Are the
logics of Foucaultian discipline, group incorporation,
response to international pressures, bureaucratic
stickiness, apportionment, and racial supremacy
really distinct, and do they combine differently in par-
ticular countries? Can we specify the causal role of
census taxonomies, compared with their reﬂective
or reifying role? When do census bureaus attain
greater autonomy, and do they use it to pursue scien-
tiﬁc rigor or ideological commitments (and when are
those sharply separable)? How are censuses’ racial
data used for purposes of advocacy, policy-making,
and representation?
Third,itwouldbevaluabletoknowhowgeneralizable
are the three motivations of politics, ideology, and
science for making sense of political actors’ choices.
Do these three forces explain the behavior of census
bureaus in other nations? Of other technological, pur-
portedly neutral service agencies? Of all important
bureaucracies? Of all governmental institutions?
Fourth, we need more research into the uneasy
relationship around the turn of the twentieth
century between what we now call the social construc-
tion of race and biologically based assertions of “racial
science” and eugenics. Each of these elements of the
American racial order has been extensively
researched, but seldom with an eye toward determin-
ing how both contributed to or were in tension with
the politics of creating and maintaining a complex
and possibly vulnerable racial order. Similarly, we
need more attention to the ways in which the full
array of racial groups were simultaneously and
mutually constituted, whether through the mechan-
isms of biology, social construction, political power,
norms and beliefs, or something else.
Finally, political scientists in our view have paid
insufﬁcient attention to the political implications of
demographic and geographic transformation.
Research in American political science tends, with
notable exceptions, to focus on the national govern-
ment located in Washington, DC—and that is argu-
ably the least good vantage point for analyzing the
upheaval experienced by old and new Americans at
present as well as around 1900. After all, a century
ago the federal government did not move despite
the vast increase in size of the United States, and it
did not change its fundamental structures or prac-
tices despite emancipation, immigration, exclusion,
acquisition, decimation, and conquest. Similarly,
immigration and multiracialism now have more
impact in North Carolina and California than in
Washington, DC. Just as historians of the West
upended our traditional Puritan-centered focus on
the American founding, so geographers and
demographers might usefully shake up the study of
American political development.
169. Jennifer Hochschild, “Multiple Racial Identiﬁers in the
2000 Census, and Then What?” in The New Race Question: How the
Census Counts Multiracial Individuals, ed. Joel Perlmann and Mary
Waters (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 340–53.
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD AND BRENNA MAREA POWELL 90Appendix Table A1. Racial Reorganization on the U.S. Census, 1850–1940
Information in bold face is on main population schedule.
Information in italics is in enumerators’ instructions for main population schedule.
Information in plain text is in tabulations or published documents.
Information inside [brackets] is explanatory.
Year Blacks American Indians Whites Asians Hispanics Other and Foreign-born
1850 Black, mulatto in Color
category
Tables often combine
mulatto and black
[Separate schedules for
free persons and slaves]
Indians taxed some-
times written in as
“other”
[No enumeration of
untaxed Indians]
— Chinese in 1852 CA
census
——
1860 Black, mulatto in
Color category
Black without admixture;
Mulatto or mixed blood
[Separate schedules for
free persons and slaves]
Indian
[No enumeration of
untaxed Indians]
—
Asiatic in CA
——
1870 Black, mulatto in Color
category
Mulatto: “quadroons,
octoroons, and all
persons having any
perceptible trace of
African blood”
Indian
[No enumeration of
untaxed Indians]
White Chinese
Chinese includes
Japanese but not
Hawaiian; Japanese
noted in footnotes
—
State or territoryof birth, orcountry
if outside US
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1Appendix Table A1. Continued
Year Blacks American Indians Whites Asians Hispanics Other and Foreign-born
1880 Black, mulatto in
Color category
Same as 1870
[Mulatto data not
reported, and
apparently never
tabulated]
Indian
[Separate schedule for
untaxed Indians,
including tribe and also
full blood, mixed white,
mixed black, adopted
white, adopted black, or
mulatto]
[Most items enumerated
in terms of several types
of racial mixture]
[Data on untaxed
Indians never
published]
White Chinese
Reference to
“Asiatics, including
Chinese, Japanese,
East Indians, etc.”
[Mexicans
sometimes
reported as
mulatto]
State or territoryof birth, orcountry
if outside US, for person and
parents
Some tables include native
with foreign-born parents
1890 Black, mulatto,
quadroon, octoroon
(category had no
label)
Black: 3/4 or more black
blood
Mulatto: 3/8 to 5/8 black
blood
Quadroon: 1/4 black blood
Octoroon: 1/8 or any
trace of black blood
Indian White Chinese, Japanese
—
State or territory of birth, or
country if outside US, for person
and parents; born abroad of
American parents; born at sea; if
parent born at sea, nationality of
that parent’s parent; years in
US; naturalized or applied to
naturalize
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2Tables usually combine
all three with black
Tables of “total
colored” include
“persons of negro
descent, Chinese,
Japanese, and civilized
Indians”
[3 schedules for
untaxed Indians. All
include % of tribe that is
full blood and mixed
blood; one also includes
tribe and white, black,
mulatto, quadroon,
octoroon, Chinese,
Japanese, or Indian]
[5 special volumes
published]
Some tables include native
with foreign-born father;
native with foreign-born
mother; foreign white;
foreign-born with American
parents; born at sea
1900 No speciﬁcation in
“Color or race” category
Black: negro or of
negro descent
Tables of “colored”
include “persons of
negro descent, Chinese,
Japanese, and Indians”
No speciﬁcation
Indian
[Separate schedule
for Indians outside
“civilized society,”
including tribe,
parents’ tribe(s),
whites or negroes
living with them]
[Fraction of white
blood: 0, 1/2, 1/4,
1/8 “or whichever
fraction is nearest
the truth”]
[Data not reported]
No speciﬁcation
White
Some tables
include native
whites with native
or foreign
parentage; foreign
white; foreign-born
with American
parents; born at sea
No speciﬁcation
Chinese, Japanese
—
No speciﬁcation
State or territoryof birth, orcountry
if outside US, for person and
parents; born abroad of American
parents; born at sea; if parent born
at sea, nationality of that parent’s
parent of the same sex; year of
immigration to US; years in US;
naturalized
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3Appendix Table A1. Continued
Year Blacks American Indians Whites Asians Hispanics Other and Foreign-born
1910 No speciﬁcation in
“Color or race”
category
Black: evidently
full-blooded negroes.
Mulatto: all persons
having some proportion
or perceptible trace of
Negro blood
Mulatto and black
usually reported
together
No speciﬁcation
Indian
Extremely detailed
tables with many
varieties of racial
mixture among
blacks, whites, and
Indians, along with
tribal mixtures
[Separate schedule
for Indians on
reservations or “in
family groups.” Inquiry
includes tribe, parents’
tribe(s), “proportions of
Indian and other
blood,” with separate
columns for Indian,
White and Negro
fractions]
No speciﬁcation
White
Some tables
include native
white of native,
foreign, or mixed
parentage; and
foreign born
No speciﬁcation
Chinese, Japanese
Some tables
include Hindus,
Koreans, Filipinos,
Maoris, Hawaiian,
part Hawaiian
Text notes that
Hindus are
ethnically
Caucasian
No speciﬁcation
[Mexicans
sometimes
reported as
mulatto]
No speciﬁcation
Other: write in the person’s race
State or territory of birth, or
country if outside US, for person
and parents; born at sea; year of
immigration to US; naturalized;
English language ability or
language spoken; mother tongue
of person and parents for
foreign-born
1920 No speciﬁcation in
“Color or race”
category
Same as 1910
Mulatto and black usually
reported together
No speciﬁcation
Indian
No speciﬁcation
White
Tables similar to
1910; mixed
parentage speciﬁed
by gender of
foreign parent
No speciﬁcation
Chinese, Japanese,
Filipino, Hindu,
Korean
No speciﬁcation
[Mexicans
sometimes
reported as
mulatto and
possibly Indian]
No speciﬁcation
Other: write in the person’s race
Queries similar to 1910
[No separate schedule]
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41930 No speciﬁcation in
“Color or race”
category
Negro: persons “of mixed
white and Negro blood, ...
no matter how small the
percentage of Negro blood.”
“Mixed Negro and Indian
blood” is Negro, “unless the
Indian blood predominates
and the status of an Indian
is generally accepted in the
community”
Mixed race reported for
tables on Virgin Islands
No speciﬁcation
Indian
“mixed white and Indian
blood” is Indian, unless
“the percentage of Indian
blood is very small, or
where he is regarded as a
white person by those in
the community where he
lives”
Use nativity columns to
“indicate the degree of
Indian blood” and tribe
[Supplemental
schedule includes
inquiry of full blood or
mixed blood]
No speciﬁcation
White
Tables similar to
1920
No speciﬁcation
Same as 1920
Some tables also
include
Hawaiian, Malays,
Siamese, Samoans.
No speciﬁcation
Mexican if person
or parents were
born in Mexico
and if not white,
Negro, Indian,
Chinese, or
Japanese
“Minor races”
include Mexican
No speciﬁcation
Other races
Other mixed races:
white-nonwhite mixture “reported
according to the nonwhite
parent.” Mixture of 2 nonwhites
“should be reported according to
the race of the father, except Negro-
Indian”
Queries similar to 1910
1940 No speciﬁcation in
“Color or race”
category
Same as 1930
No speciﬁcation
Same as 1930
No speciﬁcation
White
No speciﬁcation
Same as 1930
No speciﬁcation
White unless
deﬁnitely Indian
or some other race
No speciﬁcation
Place of birth for parents and
mother tongue, for 5% sample
only
Sources: Census population volumes; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Measuring America; Nobles, Shades of Citizenship, appendix.
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5Appendix Table A2. Growth of the Decennial Census, 1790–1990
Census year Number of
enumerators per
1,000,000 US
residents
Maximum
size of ofﬁce
staff
Total pages in
published reports
Total cost in
constant 2006
dollars (thousands)
Real cost per
capita, in dollars
1790 167 (est.)  0 56 503 0.11
1820 124  Unknown 288 2,641 0.23
1850 139  160 2,165 33,274 1.19
1860 141  184 3,189 42,645 1.13
1870 164    438 3,473 49,999 1.04
1880 630 1,495 21,458 120,879 2.00
1890 744 3,143 26,408 249,879 3.30
1900 696 3,447 10,925 276,900 3.03
1910 764 3,738 11,456 345,639 3.13
1920 825 6,301 14,550 283,467 2.23
1930 715 6,825 35,700 457,445 3.10
1960 889 2,960 103,000 854,729 3.96
1990 2,051 17,763 500,000# 4,077,170 13.63
  Enumerators were federal marshals’ assistants.
  Population revised to include adjustments for underenumeration in Southern states
# By 1990, electronic forms of publication (tape, microﬁche, CD-ROM, Internet publications) made print pages a poor indicator of census
data distributed.
Source: Adapted from Anderson, Encyclopedia of the U.S. Census, 383–84.
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